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Preface 
This thesis is written by Erkut Duranoglu and Guzide Okutucu, two M.Sc. students 
at Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), under the 
supervision of Associate Professor Stig Tenold. The aim of answering the question 
of ”How did the Ottoman Empire economically decline?” is to show, the domestic 
and international reasons of decline in terms of economic aspects. Although the 
authors considered comparing Ottoman economic history with today’s modern 
Turkish economic history, it is not included in this study since there was a time 
limitation for preparation.   
Eleven main economic factors that influenced the decline of the empire are 
analyzed in the “Analysis” part. While some of these factors had global effects, 
some of them were specific to the Ottoman Empire. 
In the first part of the thesis; the part titled with “Research Design”, the aim of the 
paper is discussed in details with important questions to be answered throughout 
the paper.  
After the research design part, “Theoretical Background” of the paper is prepared in 
order to follow the paper in the light of the relevant theories of economics.    
Before the analysis part of the thesis, in the “Introduction” part, the reader can find a 
brief history of the Ottoman Empire starting from the 13th century up to 17th century 
including a brief explanation of the empire’s longevity and the developments in the 
decline period of the empire. 
Limitations that the authors came across during the writing process and further 
research suggestions are mentioned in the “Limitations and Implications for Further 
Research” part. 
At the end of the paper, the reader can find the “Conclusion” part where authors 
discuss and weigh the various points that they described. 
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Abstract 
This study addresses the economic reasons of the decline and fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. On the contrary to the previous researches, by undertaking both global and 
domestic developments, the paper examines the decline of the empire from an 
economical point of perspective. Although international developments such as 
industrialization in European countries, pressure on the Ottomans in terms of 
integrating with the world economy, global economic factors like depressions and 
wars, as well as domestic factors such as weaknesses of the central government in 
rural areas, traditional style of governing and structure of economic institutions along 
with demographic characteristics of the empire had great influence on the decline, 
the main reason is found to be the inability of the empire to adapt itself to the both 
internal and external changes and not being resilient which resulted in significant 
economical trauma.   
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1. Glossary 
Ayan: The term ayan was used in the Ottoman Empire to refer to a variety of elites, 
particularly landed notables in either cities or the countryside. 
Beylik: were small Turkish emirates governed by Beys, roughly translated as 
"Lord", which were founded across Anatolia at the end of the 11th century in a first 
period, and more extensively during the decline of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm 
during the second half of the 13th century. 
Duyun-i Umumiye: (Office of Public Debt) Established in 1881 that oversaw tax 
collection and debt payments of the Ottoman Empire. 
Enderun: was a free-boarding school for the Christian Millet (captive people) of the 
Ottoman Empire, forced conscription and conversion to Islam. Enderun was fairly 
successful in this forceful transculturation of students, which produced many 
Ottoman statesmen. Enderun School functioned strictly for bureaucratic purposes, 
and ideally the graduates were permanently devoted to government service and had 
no interest in forming relations with lower social groups. 
Esham: was equivalent to a long-term loan, making it possible for the Ottomans to 
stave off foreign indebtedness until the 19th century.  
Iltizam: was a form of tax farm that appeared in the 17th century in Ottoman Egypt. 
Iltizams were sold off by the government to wealthy notables, who would then reap 
up to five times the amount they had paid by taxing the peasants and extracting 
agricultural production 
Inebahti: The five-hour battle which was fought at the northern edge of the Gulf of 
Patras, off western Greece, where the Ottoman forces sailing westwards from their 
naval station in Lepanto met the Holy League forces, which had come from 
Messina, on the morning of Sunday, 7 October 1571. The battle gave the Holy 
League temporary control over the Mediterranean, protected Rome from invasion, 
and prevented the Ottomans from advancing into Europe. This was the last major 
naval battle to be fought solely between rowing vessels.  
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Islahat: It means ‘reform’ in Ottoman language. 
Kaime: was a handwritten document issued in 1840 in denominations of 500 kurus 
(approximately 4.5 British pounds).  
Kurus: is a Turkish currency subunit, which equals to 40 para in Ottoman history. 
Since 2005, one new Turkish lira is equal to 100 kuruş. 
Malikane system: It is a system in which the revenue source began to be farmed 
out on a lifetime basis in return for a large initial payment to be followed by annual 
payments 
Millet: is an Ottoman Turkish term for a confessional community in the Ottoman 
Empire 
Miri mubayaa: is a policy imposing a kind of tariff to facilitate the supply of goods 
and services for the Ottomans at a price usually lower than the market levels.  
Narh lists: are the lists including the prices of goods and services, which were 
determined by the government 
Nizam-i Cedid: (new order) was a series of reforms carried out by the Ottoman 
Empire sultan Selim III during the late 18th century in a drive to catch up militarily 
and politically with the western powers. 
Para: is an old monetary unit, which equals to 1/40 of kurus. 
Riba: means usury and is generally forbidden in Islamic economic jurisprudence. 
Sened-i Ittifak: (The Alliance Treaty) was an agreement with ayans including some 
constitutional attributions. 
Shi’ism: is the second largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam 
Sipahi: was the name of several Ottoman cavalry corps. 
Sunni: is the largest denomination of Islam following Prophet Muhammad’s 
practices 
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Tanzimat: It means reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, which was a period of 
reformation that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876. 
Timar: is a land granted by the Ottoman Sultans between the 14th and 16th 
centuries. The revenues produced on this land acted as compensation for military 
service. 
Turkmen: are Turkic people located primarily in the Central Asian states of 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, northern Iraq and northeastern Iran.  
Ulema: It refers to the educated class of Muslim legal scholars engaged in the 
several fields of Islamic studies 
Yeniceri: (janissary) Comprised infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan's 
household troops and bodyguards.  
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2. Research Design 
2.1 Research Aim and Objectives 
The Ottoman Empire stood at a crossroads of intercontinental trade, stretching from 
the Balkans and the Black Sea region through the present day Middle East and 
most of the North African coast for six centuries up to World War I (WWI). In the 
research project, authors are aiming to examine the story behind the decline of 
history’s one of the biggest and long standing empire from an economical point of 
view. This paper does not attempt to provide a comprehensive history of the 
Ottoman economy. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, authors choose to 
be selective. In this volume, authors will concentrate on the period starting from the 
17th century up until the early 20th century. The focus will be Ottoman’s economic 
institutions, the long-term performance of the Ottoman economy and the reasons for 
economical decline in this particular period, especially during the 18th and 19th 
centuries. Although many historians argue that the Ottoman state and society 
showed considerable ability to reorganize and adapt to changing circumstances 
through selective institutional change along with the reforms of the 19th century, it is 
aimed to understand the effects of turbulent environment formed by both global and 
domestic factors.  
There are two main research questions in order to achieve this objective to a 
satisfying degree. These are;  
1. What are the effects of global developments such as industrialization, 
globalization, capitalism etc. on Ottoman Empire’s economic decline?  
2. How did the domestic factors such as traditional style of governing, structure 
of economic institutions and demographic characteristics of the empire etc. 
influence the course of its economic decline?   
There are numerous aspects to be touched upon in order to answer these two main 
questions in an effort to understand the reasons behind economical decline. It is 
aimed to explain the effects of Industrial Revolution on Ottoman economy and the 
situation of Ottoman industry during the revolution and understand the influence of 
industrialization and international trade on Ottoman economic growth. Along with the 
developments of globalization and capitalism, it is aimed to comprehend the effects 
 12 
of these developments on Ottoman Empire in terms of foreign direct investments, 
international trade agreements, and foreign trade policies etc. Authors also aim to 
analyze how Ottomans responded to the developing European military and political 
power in the 19th century and explore if the efforts of reforms were enough to adapt 
to changing circumstances. Apart from these, the effects and results of long 
depression and after that World War I are going to be analyzed.  
Regarding domestic factors, authors aim to explore the principles of Ottoman 
economic system that the empire relied upon and effects of these principles on 
Ottoman economy. In that respect, it is important to understand the characteristics 
of Ottoman economic and fiscal institutions and the effects of these institutions on 
Ottoman economy. Since debts and debasements played an important role on 
Ottoman economic history, genuine ways of generating income and their effects are 
going to be discussed. Authors also try to explain the situation of prices, inflation 
and wages in the Ottoman Empire. The reasons of price movements and its results 
are going to be discussed. Last but of course not the least, the effects of 
demographic factors in terms of human capital, ethnicity, religion etc. of Ottoman 
Empire on its economy are going to be explored. 
Throughout the paper answers to these questions will be sought in order to achieve 
the set objective. By doing so, the authors hope that this study will shed light on the 
Ottoman history and its reasons for decline from an economical point of perspective. 
Among many studies approaching to the same issue from political and social 
perspectives, this study is important due to its relevance to economical observations 
of the empire. 
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3. Introduction 
3.1 Brief History of Ottoman Empire 
During its foundation in the late 13th century, Ottomans were a small Sultanate 
(beylik) who dedicated itself to the holy war against Christianity. This unimportant 
small Sultanate was getting closer to the borders of Byzantine Empire and annexed 
those lands to its lands. In 1517, Ottomans became the most powerful country 
among Islamic countries by conquering Arabic lands. Everlasting military 
achievements in the area extended from the Middle Europe till Indian Sea, gave the 
Ottoman Empire a powerful place during the royalty of the Suleiman I (1520-1566) 
(Inalcik, 2006, p.9). 
 
Figure 1: Ottoman territories acquired between 1300 and 1683 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ottoman_Empire 
 
From the Balkans and the Black Sea to the Syria, Mesopotamia over Anatolia 
including Basra Gulf, Egypt and North Africa; Ottoman Empire was holding the most 
important international trade routes and crossroads. During the period between 17th 
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and 18th centuries, the population was over 30 million including many different 
ethnic origins. It is naturally expected of this fact to attract attention of many 
historians. However, long wars during the 17th century, turned the balance against 
Ottoman but in favor of Europe. In the 18th century, the empire became dependent 
to the Europe in terms of economics and politics (Inalcik, 2006, p.9).  
Unfortunately, for many years economic historians were neglecting the structure of 
this huge empire’s land policies, factories, economic policies and the daily life of its 
society. Thus longevity and durability of this empire remained for most of the people 
as a paranormal fact or like mystery. 
It would be proper if we consider this giant empire lived for six hundred years as a 
bureaucratic agricultural empire. All of its economical institutions and policies 
formed according to the priorities of the central bureaucracy.  
Unlike others, the Ottoman Empire was a so desirable piece of property that it 
remarkably remained independent until 1900. Holding the whip hand of the large 
part of Asia and Europe was the most interesting development in the history. In the 
13th century, Ottomans were ruling only one of the Turkmen beyliks that surrounded 
the Byzantine Empire during its period of decline. In two centuries, Ottomans 
established an empire including not only Southeastern Europe and Byzantines lands 
in Anatolia but also, Hungary and Arabian lands (Shaw, 2004, p.17). The empire 
stood on important trade routes, and it was the site of the most important Christian 
religious shrines. Besides, it was a great potential as a producer of agricultural 
products and raw materials for the markets of any colonizer. Therefore, we should 
first ask, “how did the Ottomans survive so long?” (McCarthy, 2001, p. 6)  before 
answering the question, “how did the Ottomans become economically backward? ” 
3.2 Secrets of Longevity 
Not only in the 19th century but also before Tanzimat (first reform act, which will be 
mentioned in the later chapters), central government was searching for solutions to 
both internal and external threats with its flexible, pragmatic and negotiating 
traditions. The government was able to pull uprising regions into their own 
coalitions. For example, Karen Barkey pointed out that during the civil disorder of 
rebellions in the 17th century, Ottomans achieved to restore order by acting flexible 
and utilizing its negotiating abilities (1994). 
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Flexibility and pragmatism means that in the modifications of the institutions and the 
policies applied; Ottomans were able to conduct without being dependent to the 
strict rules, customs and traditions, religion, old behavioral patterns and hostilities. In 
the Anatolia and the Balkans where Muslims and Christians, Turkish and Greek 
languages live together; their adaptation ability and gathering different talents from 
many different sources were the crucial factor behind Ottoman’s success and 
longevity (Pamuk, 2009, p.3).   
Ottomans embraced firearms more effectively and earlier than its neighbors. 
Ottomans were untroubled to learn from other nations and borrowing their 
institutions while conquering and expanding the empire. They managed to take local 
elites’ support by negotiating in the places where the empire cannot establish full 
sovereignty. In another words, contrary to expectations, Ottomans followed flexible 
and pragmatic behavioral patterns rather than following religious rules (Heath, 2003 
& Kafadar, 1995).  
It may well be argued that flexible, pragmatic and negotiator Ottomans achieved to 
move their empire into modern era while many other European and Asian states 
collapsed. Pamuk do not argue that Ottomans performed necessary institutional 
changes on the way of capitalism before the 19th century however thanks to 
Ottoman society and bureaucracy, which carried out some changes leaded to 
improvements starting before Tanzimat, Ottoman Empire existed for longer in the 
history. It is important to note that although some of the institutions in the empire 
altered, traditional genuine Ottoman organizations such as government ownership 
on land, trade guilds, averted private capital accumulation remained the same until 
the 19th century (2009, p.3). 
3.3 The Decline 
In the last days of Suleyman I, international conditions became inconvenient for 
Ottomans. Conquest of Cyprus in 1570-1571 was the last military achievement of 
Ottomans. Between 1578 and 1606, the empire battled with Iranians in the East and 
Middle Europe, and especially with Austro-Hungarians in the West. Those 
exhausting wars caused Ottomans to become weaker. They lost their sovereignty in 
Mediterranean Sea after Lepanto (Inebahti) war. Moreover, Ottomans also lost their 
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control over North Africa. Therefore, naval forces in Tripoli, Tunisia and Algeria were 
no more acting under the rule of sultan and these places became the nest of pirates 
who were acting in favor of their own priorities. Starting from the beginning of 17th 
century, the central government was losing control over distant states. In the Black 
Sea region, the empire couldn’t oppose to Kazakhs. They concentrated their 
pressure on coasts; and burned down Sinop in 1614 and Yenikoy in 1625. There 
was no security in the Black Sea region, which was the Ottomans’ one of the most 
important economic vessels, and Ottomans’ volume of trade and number of harbors 
started to decline (Inalcik, 2006, p.46-47).  
Another factor that influenced the Ottoman Empire’s economy was the motivation of 
looking for new routes to transport silk from Iran to Europe. Anatolia was the 
passing route for Iranian silk and European wools. British fabrics were sent to 
Middle Asia by passing through Anatolia until the end of the 16th century. The 
Ottoman Empire obtained considerable amount of income from custom duties of this 
trade. However, when Shah Abbas (king of Iran) challenged Ottomans in 1603, he 
restricted sales of silk to Ottomans, and in order to prevent the scarcity of gold and 
silver provided from this trade, he started to sell silk directly to Europe through the 
Indian Sea. By this restriction, Ottomans lost its status in silk trade, which was one 
of its major income sources. In addition to the transition of Indian trade to Atlantic 
Ocean in which Britain and Holland were dominant, trade route in Europe and 
Middle Asia began to be controlled by Russia. Thus, the control of the Ottoman 
Empire became limited with Balkans and Arabian regions in the beginning of the 
17th century (ibid.).  
On the contrary, professor Halil Inalcik (2006) claims that the reasons for the decline 
of the Ottoman Empire were mainly domestic factors (p.51). Until 1580s, Ottomans 
were seen as harmonic and stable within their own system and ideals. Maintaining 
the ratio between gold and silver in coins was an important indicator of economic 
and social stability and Ottomans achieved that for seventy years. Producer class 
knew how much tax they would pay and officers protected poor local people. Central 
government was powerful. Every member of every social class was recorded in 
books. The empire was self-sufficient in terms of its basic needs. The main imports 
were luxury goods like Iranian silk, European wools and Russian fur. However, in 
thirty years, this glorious structure would be shaked from its foundation. Managers 
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who had future concerns started to oppose to authority of the sultan. They didn’t 
take law into consideration and stole from the national treasury. Harshness, 
profiteering, bribe and other corruptions were spread with the increase in domestic 
chaos (ibid.). Increase in population from the beginning of the 16th century and 
dissolution of timar system (which will be explained in the later chapters) at the end 
of this century, ignorance attitude to the developments in Europe brought with the 
Industrial Revolution and rebellions in many minority regions with humanism 
activities in Europe were other factors that affected the empire on the course of its 
decline. 
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4. Theoretical Background 
4.1 Literature Review 
The basic line of reasoning was supported by secondary data and the findings were 
analyzed through various relevant theories and frameworks from mainly literature of 
economics.  
The theoretical line of reasoning is built on understanding the factors, their 
interactions affecting economic growth and explaining the reasons behind why the 
nature of the development process in some nations are slow and in some are fast 
and what may cause an economical decline. In order to do so, authors used several 
different growth theories with the support of institutional economic and international 
trade theories. The origins of the literature on economic growth took root from 
Arabia in 1377. The relationship between an increase in population and economic 
growth was first analyzed by the Arabian economic thinker, Ibn Khaldun.  
After that, the modern concept of economic growth developed in Western Europe by 
David Hume and Adam Smith. This model of growth remained the predominant 
model of Classical Growth until 1817. David Ricardo modified this theory by adding 
diminishing returns to land and the effects of machinery in 1817. During the period 
between 1867-1894, Karl Marx modified the Classical Theory once again. He 
envisioned the future of capitalism in his work, however his frightening vision did not 
carry over into neoclassical theory. In the General Theory of J.M Keynes in 1936, 
the theory of demand-determined equilibrium was developed. However, Keynes did 
not extend his theory into a theory of economic growth. The first to come up with an 
extension was Sir Roy F. Harrod with Evsey Domar who introduced the "Harrod-
Domar" Model of growth in 1939 and 1946 independently. This model is used to 
explain an economy's growth rate in terms of level of saving and productivity of 
capital. Robert M.  Solow (1956), Trevor Swan (1956) and, a bit later, James E.  
Meade (1961) criticized this theory and they claimed that the capital-output ratio of 
the Harrod-Domar model should not be regarded as exogenous.  
In fact, they proposed a growth model where the capital-output ratio was precisely 
the adjusting variable that would lead a system back to its steady-state growth path. 
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The resulting model has become famously known as the "Solow-Swan" or simply 
the "Neoclassical" growth model. Unlike the classical growth theory, neoclassical 
model states that advance in technology induces economic growth since it triggers 
saving and investment, which leads an increase in capital per hour of labor. In 
neoclassical growth models, the long-run rate of growth is exogenously determined 
by either a savings rate (the Harrod–Domar model) or a rate of technical progress 
(Solow model). However, the savings rate and rate of technological progress 
remained unexplained in this model. Endogenous growth theory, also called new 
growth theory, was developed by Paul Romer in 1980 as a response to criticism of 
the neoclassical growth model in order to overcome this shortcoming.   
Apart from growth theories, the institutional economics is an attempt to incorporate a 
theory of institutions into economics. Strong institutions are persistently linked to 
economic growth according to various authors. The school of institutional economics 
includes famous economists such as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, and John 
R. Commons. With the development of theories, institutionalism integrated into 
mainstream neoclassical economics, under the title of ‘new institutional economics’. 
Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) find that market-driven policies work better in large 
economies than small ones; resource-poor countries than resource-rich ones; and 
de-industrialized advanced economies than remote unindustrialized ones. Finally, 
Auty (2005) contributed about market- driven policies where market reform was 
incremental and endogenous. 
When it comes to international trade theory, it is accepted by various economists 
that trade is an important stimulator of economic growth and several different 
models have been offered to understand and analyze patterns of trade and effects 
of international trade such as Ricardian model or Heckscher-Ohlin model. Authors 
preferred to mention about Ricardian model mostly throughout the analysis of this 
study.   
4.2 Theories 
The term “economic growth” didn’t exist in early human societies, living based on 
hunting and gathering. According to the economist Parkin, economic growth began 
when societies evolved with three key institutions, markets, property rights and 
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monetary exchange that created incentives (2003, p.551). Then people began to 
specialize in producing some goods or services and trade each other. It is already 
known that real GDP increases when the quantity of labor and capital increases and 
technology advances. But the question is that, is it also true for economic growth? 
(Parkin, 2003, p.557). In development process, every nation struggle to achieve 
economic development since it is an important element, and there are some factors 
or their interactions that may affect economic growth. In this part of this paper, three 
different growth and economic theories will be examined, which may partially 
highlight the reasons behind why the nature of the development process in some 
nations are slow and in some are fast (Todaro, 1997, p.69). 
4.2.1 Classical Growth Theory 
Classical growth theory states that when the real GDP per person rises above the 
subsistence level, which is a minimum wage rate that one can survive, a population 
explosion will occur thus real GDP per person is supposed to turn back to the 
subsistence level again (Parkin, 2003, p.557). 
Explosion in population induces by advances in technology. Since advances in 
technology lead investments in new capital, labor become more productive. As labor 
become more productive, new start up businesses want to hire those productive 
labors. Therefore, rise in demand for labor leads to a rise in wages. At this stage, 
economic growth has occurred and everyone has benefited from it. However, 
according to the economists supporting the classical growth theory, this new 
situation is not persistent because, increase in real GDP as well as increase in real 
wage rate cause explosion in population (Parkin, 2003, p.557-558). More money in 
pockets leads to have more children. Nonetheless, this dismal effect of population 
growth on economic growth should be explained and viewed in another aspect. 
Neoclassical growth theory studied in the next part will try to give that aspect. 
4.2.2 Neoclassical Growth Theory 
Neoclassical model is also known as exogenous or Solow-Swan model (1956), 
which is an extension model of Harrod-Domar (1946). While Harrod-Domar model 
explains economic growth rate in terms of the level of saving and productivity of 
capital, neo-classical model adds two new terms, labor and technology. Unlike the 
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classical growth theory, neoclassical model states that advance in technology 
induces economic growth since it triggers saving and investment, which lead to an 
increase in capital per hour of labor. One of the economic influences on population 
growth is related with the opportunity cost of women’s time (Parkin, 2003, p.559). As 
the wage rate and the career opportunities of women increase, the opportunity cost 
of having a child increases as well. Thus, having no child or fewer children becomes 
more preferable by the women. The second economic influence on population 
growth is related with the death rate. Since the developments in technology 
increases gradually, improvements in health care for instance lead to extend lives. 
As it is explained above, the two opposing factors almost cancel out each other, 
which means, the rate of population growth and the rate of economic growth are 
independent from each other (Parkin, 2003, p.559). 
Technological progress is an essential factor explaining the long-term growth in 
Solow’s model. It explains how people today are more productive than they were a 
hundred years ago. Technological changes throughout the years made huge 
contribution to increasing productivity (Parkin, 2003, p.552). Beside technology, the 
quantity and the quality of labor (through population growth and education) and 
increase in capital are the other essential factors according to the model (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Technological Change versus Hour Worked 
Source: Hubbard &O’Brian, 2008, p.681 
 
The model can be explained in detail by separating economies into two; open and 
closed economies. In closed economies (having no external activities), if the saving 
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rate is low, the economic growth process is slower than when the saving rate is high 
in the short-run. In open economies (having foreign trade and investments), income 
convergence level is high since there is a capital flow from rich countries to poor 
countries where capital labor ratios are lower thus returns on investments are higher 
(Todaro, 1997, p.89). Although, the neoclassical model claims that the countries 
with lower starting level of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) have higher 
growth rate, if these less developed countries inhibit foreign trade and investments 
then it may slow down the economic development process (Barro, 1997, p. 1).  
As it has just studied through, in the neoclassical theory, technological change has a 
great influence on economic growth. The theory assumes that technological change 
occurs by chance and argues that, “When we get lucky, we have rapid technological 
change, and when bad luck strikes, the pace of technological advance slows” 
(Parkin, 2003, p.559). Therefore, the problem with this theory is poor explanation of 
how and why technological progress occurs. Besides, failure to take the effects of 
institutions, government, entrepreneurship and geography into account is the other 
missing points in the theory. To overcome these limitations of the neoclassical 
model, new growth theory was developed. 
4.2.3 Endogenous Growth Theory 
Endogenous growth theory, also called “New Growth Theory”, was developed by 
Paul Romer in 1980 to provide a better explanation to the sources of economic 
growth by providing a theory of technical progress. According to Romer, the key 
determinant of economic growth is accumulation of knowledge (Hubbard & O’Brian, 
2008, p.684). The economist Parkin agrees and adds that, it is a source of both 
increased productivity and technological advance (2003, p.552). Knowledge is a 
capital, which does not diminish as physical capital. On the contrary, by making 
labors and machines more productive, it brings increasing return (ibid).  
Technology still plays an important role in endogenous growth theory model as it 
plays in neoclassical growth theory model. However, the explanation of 
technological change differs in terms of outcomes. New growth theory model 
explains technological change as an endogenous outcome of public and private 
investments in human capital and knowledge-intensive industries (Todaro, 1997, 
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p.93). Therefore, endogenous model encourages foreign investments in knowledge-
intensive industries, which help economic development. 
In order to sell more than others, firms have to produce distinctive products, thus 
people need knowledge capital. Because it will lead to an increase in profits and 
profit urges competition. Competition encourages people to seek new technologies, 
and it is not determined by chance like neoclassical model claims. It depends on 
people’s ability to innovate. Besides, the new growth model considers economy as a 
perpetual motion. Insatiable nature of mankind drives people to innovate, create 
new products and technologies. Advance technology leads more leisure time and 
higher standards of living. Furthermore, new businesses born and old ones die, 
which implies new and better jobs for people (Parkin, 2003, p.562).  
4.2.4 Institutional Economic Theory 
Recently, the economists are emphasizing the importance of institutions and 
institutional changes in economic growth. The theory called “the new institutional 
economics”, which is based on the 500 years economic performance of Western 
Europe and the USA claims that the most important factor of economic growth and 
development is the framework consisting institutions directing to productive 
activities. By the same token, it is argued that the state has an important role to 
establish that legal framework. However, the economists accepted that institutional 
change might not be always parallel to the economic development. In the last 500 
years history of societies, it is observed that institutional changes might not always 
be in the same direction with the capitalism and economic growth and states could 
be interventionist and obstructive to economic development rather than being 
supportive. In another words, political struggles and institutional changes do not 
yield results in the favor of capitalism and economic prosperity all the time, on the 
contrary it is exceptional if the institutional change is in favor of economic growth 
according to economists (Pamuk, 2009, p.2).  
There are various types of explanations for the state, which may be depicted by 
different theories. By using a simple neoclassical theory, North (1981) described the 
state with the following characteristics based on the idea of a contract between the 
ruler (king or sultan) and his constituents: 
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1. The ruler trades protection and justice for revenue. The basic service that the 
state provides consists in the development and enforcement of a written or unwritten 
constitution. The constitution specifies the structure of property rights in order to 
maximize the rent accruing to the ruler. To achieve this, it is necessary to provide a 
set of public goods and services “designed to lower the costs of specifying, 
negotiating and enforcing contracts, which underlie economic exchange”.   
2. According to North (1981), property rights are designed to permit the 
maximization of state’s monopoly rents. In order to collect taxes, the ruler needs tax 
collectors (i.e., agents). This may cause principal-agent problems and the rents of 
the ruler will be diminished to some extent by his tax collectors, for example, the 
public bureaucracy.  
3. The ruler is constrained in his activities to some extent with respect to; 
a. The costs of emigration to another state with more favorable living conditions. 
b. The costs required overthrowing the current ruler and installing a rival who 
promises better living conditions.  
North developed his neoclassical model of the state in order to explain two 
important aspects of economic history: 
1. “The widespread tendency of states to produce inefficient property rights…” and 
2. “The inherent instability of all states, which leads to economic change and 
ultimately to economic decline” (North, 1981, p. 23).   
In the work of Margaret Levi, she argues that rulers are predatory because they try 
to extract as much revenue as they can from the population. They maximize their 
personal objectives, which require them to maximize state revenue. North (1981) 
also notes that the property-rights structure, which maximizes the social product, 
may not maximize the ruler’s long-term monopoly rents (p.23).  
North widens his theory of state in the following sense: “The state will specify rules 
to maximize the income of the ruler and his group and then, subject to that 
constraint, will devise rules that would lower transaction costs. Non-voluntary forms 
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of organization will exist if profitable to the ruler...; relatively inefficient forms of 
organization will survive if more efficient forms threatens the survival of the ruler 
from within or without...; and forms of organization that have low measurement costs 
to the rulers for tax collecting will persist even though they are relatively inefficient” 
(1981, p.43). It is important to note that North assumes in this context a rational 
ruler. In actual fact, a ruler’s conduct cannot be predicted without enough knowledge 
of his subjective position (Furubotn & Richter, 2005, p. 476).     
When it comes to the role of political institutions on economic system, Weingast 
emphasizes the fundamental dilemma as is follows: 
“A government strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is 
also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its citizens. Thriving markets require 
not only the appropriate system of property rights and a law of contracts, but also a 
secure political foundation that limits the ability of the state to confiscate wealth” 
(1995, p.1).    
As the theory and practice from history shows us that, the power of the rulers can be 
limited by political institutions (Furubotn & Richter R, 2005, p. 479). 
4.2.5 International Trade Theory 
In the historical development of the developing countries throughout, Africa, Asia, 
Middle East and Latin America, international trade has played a crucial role. 
Overseas sale of agricultural products or other commodities formed 25-40 percent 
of the monetary GNP. In addition to the export dependence of these developing 
countries, the influence of imports on economy cannot be denied. Import demands 
exceeded the capacity to generate revenues provided from exports for developing 
countries in time. This situation led budget deficits on the current account. In order 
to compensate the budget deficit, countries began to ask foreign debts and 
investments. However, since these debts and investments reached to critical levels, 
repayment couldn’t be achieved. Severe deficits in most of the developing countries 
led depletion in international monetary reserves, which causes slow down in 
economic growth. As it is stated in the traditional argument of the trade theory and 
development, “trade is an important stimulator of economic growth” (Todaro, 1997, 
p.435). 
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5. Analysis 
Before starting to analyze the reasons behind the decline of the Ottoman Empire, it 
would be better to draw the boundaries of this research first. Authors’ aim is not to 
give a comprehensive economic history of the Ottoman Empire as it is stated 
before. The main purpose is to analyze either internal or external elements 
considered as significant factors that directly or indirectly caused economical 
deterioration of the Ottoman Empire. It is difficult to separate and examine those 
factors under a certain category as international or domestic because of their 
complex nature. However, this paper separated and examined those factors 
according to their zone of influence, whether they have affected a specific region in 
the world or remained limited within the empire and affected the Ottoman economy. 
The analysis of this paper is starting with the Industrial Revolution, which was one of 
the most fundamental international factors behind the decline. After examining the 
influence of industrialization on Ottoman economy and the situation of the empire 
during revolution, reform efforts of the empire will be studied. Although globalization 
and development of capitalism was an ongoing process, their effects and results on 
Ottoman economy will be investigated in the aftermath of reform movements. It will 
be touched upon the efforts of generating income of the empire while the 
economical decline was deepening. Following that, the effects of the empire’s debt 
policies and debasements on Ottoman price and wage levels will be analyzed. It will 
be also mentioned about the effects of long depression and devastating World War I 
while Ottoman economy was getting closer to the collapse. However the decline of 
the Ottoman Empire cannot be fully explained by considering only international 
factors. The importance of the effects of domestic factors should not be 
underestimated. Existing framework of Ottoman institutions, traditional governing 
styles, characteristics of demographics and social dynamics of the empire had an 
important role on decline as well. These factors will be also highlighted in several 
parts of the paper in order to comprehend the big picture of the course of Ottoman 
economic decline.  
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5.1 Industrial Revolution 
The story of decline actually begins with the Industrial Revolution, which was started 
in England around 1750. It was a period that a significant economic growth began in 
the UK and a number of other countries in Western Europe. It was one of biggest 
change around the world, which affected many economies. Before the Industrial 
Revolution, the production of goods and services had relied on human or animal 
power. However, with the spread of mechanical power like steam engines or 
factories producing cotton cloth, the amount that labors could produce had 
increased enormously (Hubbard & O’Brian, p.674-675). Starting with England and 
then the other Western European countries experienced long-run economic growth 
with increasing real GDP per capita and living standards. But why England was the 
first country experienced Industrial Revolution at first hand? It could have occurred 
in the Middle East, but it didn’t. According to the economist Douglass North, 
England differed in its institutions from other countries. He believes that after the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, the British court system became independent of the 
king, which means the parliament started to undertake the maintaining private 
property rights, protecting wealth and eliminating arbitrary increases in taxes 
(Hubbard & O’Brian, p.675). By those institutional changes, entrepreneurs took 
incentives to create new technologies that would be used in manufacturing, mining 
and transportation areas.  
5.1.1 Growth Models Explaining the Influence of Industrialization 
and International Trade on Economic Growth 
Industrialization and international trade are the two most important engines for 
economic growth. Especially the Industrial Revolution is accepted as the key for fast 
growth. Beginning with the steam engine, new inventions led rise in labor 
productivity in this period, which was the exogenous factor of growth. Besides, 
during the Industrial Revolution, many countries adopted new technologies to 
promote developments in manufacturing sector. Due to that, the importance of 
agriculture was placed after manufacturing sector in most of the industrialized 
countries. Addition to that, in international trade, which is seen as a second 
important factor in growth, open economies had experienced rapid economic growth 
during the 19th century. In order to see the influence of industrialization and 
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international trade on economic growth, a simple two-sector endogenous growth 
model could be helpful. According to the model, those two sectors are 
manufacturing and agriculture. Since manufacturing sector have learning-by-doing 
effect, both physical and human capital accumulation is possible, thus the growth of 
the manufacturing sector pulls the economy with it. However, learning-by-doing 
effect is not existed in agricultural sector of the economy, implying no growth in 
technology (Wong & Yip, 1999, p.164). 
5.1.2 Industrial Revolution and the Middle East 
The Industrial Revolution was first turned Great Britain then other countries in 
Western Europe into such economies that produce finished goods with low-cost and 
large amounts. In the second quarter of the 19th century, some leading countries in 
Europe were trying to find new markets for their finished goods and rich and low-
priced raw material sources. After Industrial Revolution, the relations between 
industrialized countries got stronger and the finished-good trade between Western 
Europe and third world countries was rapidly expanded. Between 1820 and 1913, 
the economic integration of the Middle East with the world economy had occurred. 
As a result of this integration, the foreign trade of Middle East grew more than fifteen 
times. As the foreign trade grew, significant change in production facilities occurred. 
In the most of the regions around Middle East, agriculture became commercialized 
and the remaining agricultural production was directed to export markets. On the 
contrary, the development in foreign trade, industry was deteriorated. Handicraft 
tried to stand still but it deteriorated in opposition to the competition of import 
products (Pamuk, 2008, p.39).  
Trade was not the only way that European economies utilized to flourish, Europe 
also exported its capital to other countries. European equity owners invested in 
infrastructure activities in railways and harbors to expand the trade. Besides, the 
exported capital from Europe was used as debt by third world countries, along with 
other investments utilized for agriculture and industry, which limited direct 
production until the WWI (Pamuk, 2008, p.4-5). Since the debts of Middle Eastern 
countries taken from Europe reached to high levels, Europe could have voice in 
affairs about Middle Eastern economy. After all, when it is compared with Europe, 
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the economical growth and living standards in the Middle East was lower (Pamuk, 
2008, p.40). 
5.1.3 Ottoman Empire During the Industrial Revolution 
If a country cannot catch up with the developments in the pattern of the trade, it 
cannot keep in pace with the rest of the world and produce agriculture only (Wong & 
Yip, 1999, p.164). That was what Ottoman had experienced during the Industrial 
Revolution. “If the economy is completely specialized in agriculture, then no 
learning-by-doing effect exist, and the home economy will have no incentive to 
invest in physical capital because physical capital is not used in agricultural sector” 
(Wong & Yip, 1999, p.179).         
Ottoman industry in the 18th century was not like the explosive industrial growth 
occurring in Western Europe during the Industrial Revolution. Ottoman industry 
sometimes expanded or shrunk and at other times it remained motionless. 
Nonetheless, patterns of Ottoman industrial development do not show trends, which 
are potential symptoms of modern economic growth.  
One of the reasons for the failure of the Ottoman Empire to initiate a process of 
economic growth, might be policies that barred such a process. The principles – 
provisionism, traditionalism and fiscalism – that guided the Ottoman economic 
system, might have hindered the introduction of new technology. However, as it was 
emphasized in the neoclassical growth theory, advance in technology is the key 
determinant of economic growth since it triggers saving and investment. By 
hindering the introduction of new technologies, the productivity of labor force 
declined so as the capital per hour of labor. As no capital means no investment, the 
empire couldn’t catch up with developed countries.  
The first principle which Ottomans relied on called provisionism was postulating the 
maintenance of a steady supply so that all goods and services were cheap, plentiful, 
and of good quality. Provisionism sought to keep the supply of goods and services 
to internal markets at optimum level so that there could not be any shortage. This 
leads to the policies, which motivates imports instead of exports. Export was not 
encouraged with quotas, and extra taxes but imports, by contrast, were fostered and 
facilitated. There were no import substitution policies such as tariffs, quotas or taxes 
as long as imports helped to maintain the steady supply. At times when imports 
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could not carry out this purpose, import substitution polices were put in operation 
(Genc, 1994, p.60). The miri mübayaa regime was one of the measures in Ottoman 
Empire to reduce expenses. This policy imposed a kind of tariff to facilitate the 
supply of goods and services for the empire at a price usually lower than the market 
levels. This policy was not concerning imports thus an import substitution policy was 
only implemented when the volume of imports threatened the state’s fiscal standing. 
Even in these times, Ottomans did not prefer to pursue strong protectionist customs 
since this might lead to an increase in prices on the internal market.  Later in the 
year 1838, these policies became very limited by Baltalimani Agreement, which will 
be mentioned in details on later chapters. In the following years, the empire would 
encounter with huge budget deficit on the current account resulted from exceeded 
import demands that couldn’t be provided by revenues generated from exports. As 
the budget deficit expanded, Ottomans began to borrow foreign debts in order to 
finance the deficit. According to the theory of international trade, those severe 
deficits in most of the developing countries including Ottomans, led depletion in 
international monetary reserves, caused a slow-down in economic growth (Todaro, 
1997, p.435).  
The second important principle that ruled Ottoman economic policy was 
traditionalism. It may be summarized as the tendency to maintain existing systems 
and conditions instead of searching for new models and alternatives to find solutions 
when changes occurred. There was a very-well known genuine Ottoman motto 
’kadimden olagelene aykırı iş yapılmaması’, which means one should not work 
against what comes from the olden time. Mehmet Genc (1994) claimed in his article 
that this expression remained a vital component of the referential framework of the 
Ottoman economic system that remained unchanged during the 18th century (p.60).  
Fiscalism was the third principle guiding Ottoman economic system. Fiscalism was 
suggesting maximizing the treasury income and preventing it from falling below 
already-attained levels. According to Genc, increasing the income of the treasury 
was difficult and slow since it was parallel to the rhythm of slow increase in the 
production capacity of the Ottoman economy and the degree of monetization. 
Consequently, Ottoman fiscalism developed in the direction of preventing a fall in 
incomes and reducing expenses. This principle was so inflexible that it viewed all 
economic activity only in terms of the tax income yielded (1994, p.60).  
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In the 18th century industrial developments in Ottoman Empire with its three 
economic principles (provisionism, traditionalism, fiscalism) the state control over 
production increased especially in urban industrial sector. In order to avoid the 
pressure and limitations of the state control, producers moved to small production 
places in distant provinces of the empire where such controls had not yet been 
established. However, rural industry was always active but because of the 
provisionist policies of the Ottoman Empire, never had the chance to develop. 
Furthermore, in such rural industry where producers produced and sold finished 
goods in the local markets, required the possibility of exporting in order to develop. 
However this was only possible along with active export policy against mercantilist 
and protectionist west. Due to the provisionist policies, export remained always as a 
marginal sector that the state heavily taxed and actively hindered (Genc, 1994, 
p.64). 
The state was not only imposing policies against development of manufacturing, but 
it also worked against capital accumulation that might be necessary grounds for 
these developments. Along with the regime of miri mübayaa, those producing or 
trading cotton, thread, iron, timber etc. were burdened. Starting from 1770s, more 
burdens were imposed on the manufacturers who had some accumulated capital. 
Ottoman state forced these producers to equip troops or provide compulsory loans 
when the treasury was dangerously low. Furthermore, during the period 1770-1810, 
when finances were in a crisis, state confiscated the inheritance of private 
individuals who were rich. In these conditions, which were totally against capitalist 
developments in the world, the obstacles to capital accumulation and investment 
reached to a peak (Genc, 1994, p.66). The empire temporarily provided capital by 
confiscating properties and inheritance of private individuals. According to the 
neoclassical model of the state developed by North (1981), inefficient property rights 
and inherent instability of the state leads economic change and ultimately to 
economic decline (p.23). North (1981) also notes that the property-rights structure, 
which maximizes the social product, may not maximize the ruler’s long-term 
monopoly rents. If the empire would have strong political institutions, these 
institutions might have limited the absolute power of the ruler (sultan). Considering 
the role of the political institutions on economic system, with strong political 
institutions, the government couldn’t have confiscated the wealth of its citizens. By 
the same token, empire would have had an appropriate system of property rights 
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with a law of contracts and a secure political foundation that limits the ability of the 
state to confiscate wealth (Weingast, 1995, p.1). 
The only group, which was not affected by this destructive atmosphere, was small-
scale, craft production in the local markets. These craft organizations were the 
predominant form of organization in Ottoman industry during the 18th century. One 
of the feature of this Ottoman industry in the 18th century is that, the main 
concentration of the production was ordinary commodity products for non-luxury 
consumption such as cotton and woolen cloths, food, building materials, household 
items, earthen-and wooden-wares. Most of the high-quality products consumed by 
upper-income society were imports and according to provisionisim; obtaining these 
goods from abroad was not considered as harmful in anyway. According to the 
Ottoman economic principles that the state relied upon, providing a custom 
protection would be meaningless. Thus, Ottoman manufacturing and factories faced 
stiff competition from Western Europe’s increasingly developed industrial products. 
For instance, in Ottoman woolen market around 18th century, imports from Western 
Europe formed nearly fifty percent of the total. The amount of imports were 
constantly increasing thus the price of the imported goods were continually 
decreasing. The imported products became more available and a lot cheaper in the 
empire. The survival of local manufacturing under these circumstances required 
strong protectionist policies as well as entrepreneurs with accumulated capitals in 
order to establish most advanced industrial technology and organizational forms of 
manufacturing (Genc, 1994, p.73). However, there had never been any policies 
neither protecting against imports nor supporting capital accumulation in the empire.  
In writing the story of Ottoman industrial development, it is clear that many important 
manufacturing groups diminished and disappeared in opposition to European 
competition during 18th century. Other industries temporarily lost customers during 
the high amount of imports between 1820 and 1850, but later regained their 
customers after adapting themselves to new conditions. Beginning from the early 
1870s and continuing, there was a manufacturing revival in the 19th century’s 
Ottoman Empire fluctuating until World War I (Quataert, 1993, p.87). However this 
was limited in compare to international developments and efforts might not enough 
to change the empire’s destiny.   
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5.2 Reforms 
Countries in Middle East carried out many reforms as a response to Europe’s 
developing military and political power, which has occurred after the Industrial 
Revolution. Existence of the new technologies in military, communication and 
transportation areas supported these reforms (Pamuk, 2008, p.78). The period 
under the royalty of Mahmut II (1808-1839) was a difficult time for Ottoman Empire. 
During 30 years, the government tried to cope with many commotions, nationalist 
revolutions and wars. Especially the wars with Russia, Iran and Egypt hurt the 
Ottoman economy badly. This period was a crucial period in which Ottomans were 
entering into reforms in order to shape governing style in Western type. Before that, 
under the royalty of Selim III (1789-1807), they tried to form an army in Western 
standards but encountered by yeniceri (janissary) opposition. After abolishing the 
janissary division in 1826, the activities to form a standing army “Nizam-i Cedid” 
accelerated. In 1820s, reforms were not limited in only military area but also covered 
management, justice and education areas. For those reforms, Ottomans 
necessitated more assets. Between 18th century and 1840, half of the government 
expenditures were in military area. Since the share of military expenditures rose in 
war times, it brought a huge burden to the government. Therefore, one of the targets 
of the reform process was to reorganize the empire and centralize the revenues 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.101). During the 18th century, since Ottoman Empire necessitated 
the financial support of the West, the empire had to give concessions. Due to that, 
two main reforms were prepared. 
5.2.1 The Tanzimat and Islahat Decrees (1839 – 1856) 
The Tanzimat and Islahat (The Reform Edict) Decrees promulgated under the ruler 
of Abdulmecid I and Abdulaziz, who were the pioneers of the first democratic 
attempts of the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent an economic and social disorder 
in the state. The two reforms were aiming to leave the decision making process to 
an independent parliament by limiting the absolute power of the sultan. Besides, in 
both reforms there were new arrangements in education, army, administration, 
provinces and the society. Besides its economic and social effects, political 
implications of the prescripts would have deeper effects in economy in the long run.  
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From the Ottoman point of view, the main purpose of declaring Tanzimat was to 
maintain and preserve the Ottoman state against uprisings and together with, to 
gain sympathy and diplomatic support of European countries. However, Europeans 
had a different goal by accepting Tanzimat. They were concerning about the rights 
of Christians living within the empire and they wanted those rights such as; 
principles of individual liberty, freedom from oppression, and equality before the law 
etc. to be improved. This led an increase in economic and political power of 
Christian middle class. On the other hand, Muslims received none of these benefits 
brought by the two reforms.  
Islahat Decree was intended to carry out the promises of Tanzimat, but it was more 
specific about the religious issues. Since there was a constant pressure on non-
Muslims to be converted into Islam, the idea of freedom to practice one’s own 
religion without harassment was promoted by Islahat Decree (Deringil, 2000).   
The effectiveness of these two reforms is open to debate. There were two sides 
during the Tanzimat period. On one side, which was against the reforms, claimed 
that “…although the movement was a democratic approach to the stagnant 
economic and political system, the concessions and incentives involved in the 
reforms allowed foreign powers to become more and more prominent in the stately 
affairs after the declaration” (Bayraktar, 2009). On the other hand, supporters of the 
reforms believed that new arrangements brought clarity to issues such as the 
equality of all subjects before the law, regardless of religion as well as being a 
decisive step towards extended guarantee by the Great Powers to the territorial 
integrity of the empire.  
The state has an important role to establish a legal framework, however the 
economists accepted that institutional change might not be always parallel to the 
economic development. In the last 500 years history of societies, it is observed that 
institutional changes might not always be in the same direction with the capitalism 
and economic growth and states could be interventionist and obstructive to 
economic development rather than being supportive. In another words, political 
struggles and institutional changes do not yield results in the favor of capitalism and 
economic prosperity all the time, on the contrary it is exceptional if the institutional 
change is in favor of economic growth according to economists (Pamuk, 2009, p.2). 
 35 
As a result, according to Bayraktar (2009), whether or not the reforms weakened the 
integrity of the empire and made it susceptible to foreign incursion is debatable, yet 
it is an accepted fact from both parties that the reforms intended for the Ottoman 
Empire was not applicable due to the absence of manufacturing performance, which 
is in turn fueled by the monopoly of the guilds and the autarchic governance of the 
economy. Combined with the failures in military campaigns and the failing timar 
system  in the early 19th century, the decrees severely curbed the flow of income 
into the state (p. 7).  
5.3 Globalization 
One of the factors explaining why some of the developing countries didn’t 
experienced rapid growth in the 19th century after the Industrial Revolution can be 
explained by classical growth theory, which is mainly related with low rates of saving 
and investment. In order to develop, countries should invest in factories, 
machineries etc. so that labor become more productive and businesses demand 
more labor. As the demand for productive labor increases, wages go up so does 
population. But for these investments the government needs funds. However, since 
in most of the developing countries, households barely survive by their income, so it 
was impossible to save enough. Hubbard and O’Brian (2008) states that, low saving 
rates in developing countries contribute to a vicious cycle of poverty (p.684). Since 
households couldn’t save enough, few funds were available for firms to borrow and 
invest in physical capital. Therefore, most of the developing countries couldn’t catch 
up with the European countries in terms of economic growth, and household 
incomes. 
5.3.1 Ottoman Example During Globalization Period 
The most important characteristic that distinguished Ottoman Empire from other 
developing countries during globalization period of opening into the World economy 
was a strong centralized government. From the beginning of the 19th century under 
the royalty of Mahmut II, Ottoman made many reforms against increasing military 
and economic power of Europe and nationalism movements of ethnic minorities in 
distant provinces and Balkans. As a result of these activities, influence of these 
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minorities was deteriorated. The control of central government in military and 
political aspects was increased. However, in order to increase the control and power 
of the central government, Ottomans had to take support from Europe. It is true that, 
Europe was supporting reforms; especially Great Britain wanted Ottomans to 
become more powerful in its politics related to Eastern-European region. In this way, 
it could block Russia to reach Mediterranean Sea.  
European countries demanded Ottomans to open into the foreign market as much 
as possible as a reward for military, political and financial support. Therefore, reform 
activities followed with concessions in foreign trade and foreign capital. Besides, 
European control was increasing gradually as Ottoman Empire opened its economy 
to the world market. For instance, with the reform, which mandated in 1856, foreign 
capital investment and in 1867 purchasing land by foreigners were allowed. 
Although these activities were mentioned as a European control over Ottoman 
economy, according to Hubbard and O’Brian (2008), by allowing foreign capital 
investment, Ottoman Empire had a chance to break the vicious cycle of low saving 
and investment, which led low growth (p.697). With foreign capital investment, 
Ottomans could access new technologies by know-how and additional funds. The 
importance of technological change, which is more important than increase in 
capital, is mentioned in both economic growth models (neoclassical and 
endogenous). The easiest way that governments of developing countries should 
follow to access new technology is the path through foreign capital investment. 
Ottoman governors were thinking short-term political and financial support of 
European countries, not long-term financial results. The turning points of Ottomans’ 
economy in the period of opening into the foreign market were; 1838s free trade 
agreement, 1854s foreign debt period and 1850s privileges given to foreign capital 
for establishing railways. (Pamuk, 2008, p.5-7) 
5.3.2 Baltalimani Free Trade Agreement 
In 1838, Baltalimani free trade agreement was first signed between Ottomans and 
Great Britain, then France and the rest of the European countries. According to this 
agreement, monopolies in foreign trade were taken out and Ottomans forwent its 
right to put higher taxes or limitations on foreign trade. These applications made it 
easier for Ottomans’ economy to open into the foreign markets. However, Ottomans 
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were also losing most significant source of income by this agreement. Another 
arrangement that the agreement brought was about customs duty. The free trade 
agreement led customs duties to decline and made it difficult for Ottomans to raise 
the customs duties for financial or protectionist reasons (Pamuk, 2008, p.80).  
Before 1838, Ottoman Empire was taking 3 percent customs duty from both imports 
and exports. Addition to that, both domestic and foreign dealers had to pay 8 
percent internal customs duty when they transport their products within the empire’s 
borders. This agreement increased the customs duty ratio on exports to 12 percent, 
and on imports to 5 percent. Besides, while domestic dealers continued to pay 
internal customs duty, foreign dealers were out of this application. Thus, foreign 
dealers obtained privilege against domestic dealers. In the following years, 
European countries caught some opportunities to decrease the customs duty ratio 
from 12 percent to 1 percent in 1860s. Only after WWI, Ottoman could able to 
retract Baltalimani agreement and followed more independent foreign trade policy.  
Why Ottomans signed such an agreement having severe requirements? In order to 
give an answer to that question, the conditions in that century should be examined. 
Great Britain became unrivalled in the world market after Industrial Revolution. 
However, other countries, which haven’t been industrialized yet, were blocking 
Great Britain to enter into their markets. In this condition, Great Britain was directed 
to other markets outside Europe and signed many free trade agreements from 
China to South America by force of arms if necessary. On the other hand, Ottoman 
Empire was looking for new ways to catch developments occurred in Europe after 
the Industrial Revolution. The empire realized that the only way to develop 
economically as European countries did, was to bring advance technology from 
Europe, since according to the neoclassical growth theory, adoption of new 
technology is the key of economic growth as advance in technology triggers savings 
and investments. 
The volume of trade between Ottoman Empire and Great Britain was increasing 
starting from 1820s. But British dealers were complaining about trade limitations put 
by Ottomans and wanted to secure their relationships with long-term agreements. 
Great Britain was waiting for a weak time of Ottomans to sign those long-term trade 
agreements. That time arose with rebellion of Mehmet Ali Pasa in Egypt. When this 
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rebellion got bigger with the support of Russia, Ottomans wanted Britain to help. 
Britain supported Ottomans in terms of military and politics by taking financial 
concessions as a return. Therefore, Baltalimani agreement signed under these 
conditions. As a result of this agreement; imported goods invaded domestic markets 
and expanded quickly. Domestic goods deteriorated in opposition to the competition 
of imported goods. Some of the crafts showed endurance with respect to the 
developed technology coming from Europe by accepting working with low salaries. 
However, both using new technology, instead of animal or human power, and taxes 
paid for its usage hurt economic growth (Leung, 1999, p.184). Working with low 
salaries with intense production is accepted as an important reason for 
underdevelopment. (Pamuk, 2008, p.29-37)  
5.3.3 Foreign Trade 
In the economic development of the industrialized nations, free trade played a 
significant role. For most of the economists, free trade has often referred as the 
“engine of growth” (Todaro, 1997, p.120). Expansion of the export markets after the 
Industrial Revolution gave stimulus to the local demands, which led establishment of 
manufacturing industries. It is the fact that most poor countries need to obtain 
foreign exchange in addition to domestic savings in order to finance development 
projects, such as building manufacturing industries (Todaro, 1997, p.53). Export 
growth is said to result in increased output, employment and consumption, all of 
which lead to an increase in the demand for a country’s output (Jung and Marshall, 
1985). Having relatively stable politics and flexible institutions, and increased export 
earnings enabled developing countries to borrow funds from the international capital 
market at very low interest rates. With this capital accumulation, the production of 
industries increased and led more diversified industrial structure (Todaro, 1997, 
p.120).  
Terms of Trade in 19th Century’s Export of World and Middle East 
19th century is a period to integrate rapidly with the world economy for Middle 
Eastern economies. However, in this period the growth speed of export in 
underdeveloped regions was same as the average growth speed of world export 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.42). Today’s underdeveloped regions, opened to world economy 
after the Industrial Revolution. Therefore, the initial effect of the Industrial Revolution 
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to the underdeveloped regions was an unprecedented growth in export capacity 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.56). Starting from the second quarter of the 19th century, Britain 
and other European countries were trying to create a market for their manufactured 
goods and reach cheap raw material sources.  
In the early 19th century, foreign trade level per capita of Asian states in Ottoman 
Empire was comparable to Iran’s. However, between 1840 and World War I, the 
export of Ottoman Empire grew twice as Iran’s. Although, Ottomans’ foreign trade 
grew gradually, the empire could not catch the great growth speed occurred during 
1850 in world markets. It would be easier to comprehend Ottoman industrial growth 
rate when it is compared with other countries in the neighborhood. For instance, 
before WWI, the export per capita in Egypt was as big as 1,5 times of Ottomans’ 
and four times of Iran’s. In the early 20th century, income per capita in Egypt was 
lower than Ottomans’ but higher than Iran’s. In the view of this table compared to 
Ottomans and Iran, it is argued that unlike Ottoman Empire, Egypt achieved to 
direct a large part of its production to export (Pamuk, 2008, p.48).   
Ottoman Empire and Egypt in the 19th Century: Comparison of Foreign 
Trade and Investment 
From the 19th century till the WWI, the exports in Egypt kept increasing. Exports per 
capita increased ten times between 1840s and WWI. The total exports reached to 
treble in 1860s and between 1870s and WWI. Therefore, the prewar foreign trade 
level per capita in Egypt was 2,5 times higher than Anatolia’s, where was the 
homeland of the Ottoman Empire. In compared to that, the production and income 
levels per capita in Anatolia were higher than Egypt’s. In that case, the production in 
Egypt was more directed to the world markets than Anatolia’s in the prewar period. 
Especially after 1870s, the growth speed of exports in Anatolia was behind the 
underdeveloped countries’ levels. In pre-war period, the export level per capita in 
Anatolia was behind the medium-scale Asian, African and Latin American countries. 
In contrast, the export level per capita in Egypt, in terms of both volume and speed, 
was higher than those medium-scale countries (Pamuk, 2008, p.81). 
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Internal and External Factors in Growth of Foreign Trade 
The fundamental reason of growth in the Middle Eastern foreign trade was; 
appearance of economies, which need raw materials, and their production of low-
priced products along with the Industrial Revolution (Pamuk, 2008, p.49). 
After the year 1860, the demand of industrialized countries was increasing 
gradually, however, the total demand was receding from export products of Ottoman 
Empire, Iran and Egypt. Ottomans left its place in industrialized country markets to 
other countries, which export the same products as Ottomans after 1870s (Pamuk, 
2008, p.51). 
Until the beginning of the 20th century, the share of export in total production was 
less than 10 percent in Ottoman Empire. If those economies provided a rise in 
production per capita -Ottoman achieved in pre WWI- the explanation of this fact 
should be looked for another place. The growth in exports is one of the factors that 
affect economical growth (Pamuk, 2008, p.53). 
Comparison of Trade and Foreign Investment 
In the early 1820s, the ratio of Ottomans’ exports and imports to total capacity of 
production was under 5 percent, however, during the century the foreign trade of 
Ottoman Empire, especially with Western Europe, grew rapidly. Free trade 
agreements supported these inclinations by eliminating protectionist approach of 
Ottoman Empire. According to Hubbard and O’Brian (2008), by protectionist 
approach, like putting higher tariffs on foreign imports and discouraging or even 
prohibiting foreign investment, a developing country cannot break the vicious cycle 
of poverty (p.697). European capital started to evolve in fiscal area of Ottoman 
Empire in mid-century. In twenty years, the Ottoman Empire became heavily foreign 
indebted and could not repay, so this led Europe to have control over Ottomans’ 
internal affairs (Pamuk, 2008, p.63). 
The foreign investments in Ottoman Empire were mostly in infrastructure areas, 
especially, railways and harbors. In contrast, the foreign investments in production 
activities in agriculture, industry and mining areas were limited. Therefore, foreign 
investors didn’t have much effect on production facilities; they only tried to 
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encourage the enlargement of foreign trade and integration with the world economy 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.63-64). 
Enlargement in foreign trade caused agriculture to become commercial and 
handicraft activities to deteriorate. Against the competition of imported goods, until 
1910s, the employment and the production level in the sector declined (Pamuk, 
2008, p.64). The factors that determines the integration of a peripheral country with 
the world economy were; the size of the country, the geographical location of the 
region and the natural resources, climate and agricultural conditions of the country 
in the beginning of 1910s. In addition to these factors, inside and outside political 
power relations determines the level of integration with the world economy (Pamuk, 
2008, p.70). 
5.4 Ottoman Economic Policy 
In order to understand Ottomans’ economic policy, first and foremost it is necessary 
to investigate the qualities of the state and its relations with different social groups. 
In the Ottoman society, up until the end of the 15th century there were intensive 
conflicts between Turkish originated aristocracy living in the provinces of the empire 
and bureaucracy in the central government. After Sultan Mehmed II, state 
confiscated the lands under private property and power shifted from aristocracy to 
the bureaucracy in the center. This was the end of aristocracy based on lands 
possessed. After this reform, the effect of landowners, merchants and 
moneylenders on state’s economic policies became limited. 
Central bureaucracy was aiming to establish a social order in which they have the 
authority. The supplies of the city economy, long-distance trade and import were 
going to maintain stability in this order. The state was supporting the operations of 
the merchants, guilds and moneylenders as long as they contribute to form this 
social order. Although central institutions got weaker during 17th and 18th centuries, 
producers and merchants did not get strong enough to put pressure on the state to 
change these traditional policies. However in Europe, mercantilist policies 
dominated since producers and merchants were getting stronger everyday (Pamuk, 
2009, p.21). 
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In the article of Mehmet Genç, economic policies and priorities of the central 
bureaucracy are investigated. Genç argued that economic issues should always 
been considered among religious, military, administrative and fiscal concerns in the 
Ottoman Empire. According to Genç, the number one priority of the Ottomans about 
the economic issues was feeding of the city economy including army, palace and 
bureaucracy. Ottomans were aware of the importance of merchants supplying the 
city markets (1989).  
In the 16th century, after conquering Syria and Egypt, long-distance trade and 
controlling of the trade routes became even more important (Güçer, 1987 & Inalcik, 
Quataert 1994).  
Ottomans were showing a special interest to foreign merchants since they brought 
the goods, which were not available in the empire. The privileges, which is going to 
be mentioned as capitulations later, given to foreign merchants starting from the 16th 
century was emanated from these concerns.  
According to Genç, the second priority of the central state was generating financial 
income. State was intervening to the economic activities in order to collect tax. 
Ottoman authorities were aware that the economy should be vital and strong in 
order to stay fiscally powerful however, they were not hesitating to force producers 
and charge extra taxes to them in the short-term economic recession periods. The 
third priority was closely related with the first two; maintaining the traditional order. 
According to Ottoman ruling class, there was a social order and a balance between 
farmer, merchant and guild. State was trying to protect this order and balance in the 
society (1989).  
State’s attitudes towards merchants was involving serious dilemmas. On one side, it 
was accepted that small or big; all merchants had an important role in the 
administration of the city economy. However, profit oriented activities of the 
merchants may cause scarcity of some of the fundamental goods and put guilds and 
city economy in difficult situations. In those cases, state prefers to inspect these 
merchants instead of support or protect them. State’s attitudes towards 
moneylenders and usurers were also including ambiguities (İslamoglu & Keyder, 
1977, p. 31-55). 
Ottoman government did not hesitate to intervene to the local and long-distance 
trade in order to manage city economy by following these priorities. When it is 
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compared to the other states’ ruled by Islamic laws and practices, it is observed that 
Ottomans intervened more to the economy (Pamuk, 2009, p.22). 
5.4.1 Why Ottomans did not Follow Mercantilist Policies? 
Why Ottomans did not follow mercantilist policies supporting merchants and 
producers, while other European states did follow in the same era, and why 
Ottomans did not foresee the destructive effects of the imports on economy are 
among the frequently discussed issues. In the Ottoman Empire, importing was 
supported by the state, since it caused the supply of the local goods increase in the 
local markets. However, exporting was only allowed if the local demand was met. 
The state was not hesitating to ban exporting of food and raw materials during 
economic downturns. 
The difference is apparent between the Ottoman policies, which give priority to 
urban consumers, and mercantilist practices in the Europe. Ottomans were aware of 
the mercantilist concept and practices. For instance, in the beginning of the 18th 
century, Efendi defended mercantilist practices and argued that Ottoman money 
would stay in the empire if Muslims preferred to buy local goods instead of exports 
(1968). 
There could be many reasons behind Ottoman policies, which were not mercantilist 
at all. Could it be the Ottoman bureaucrats’ shortsighted thoughts? Or maybe 
because of vast majority of the Ottoman imports were not usually produced in the 
empire, thus not threatening the local production. According to Pamuk (2009), these 
arguments should include some elements of truth, but the main reason behind is 
that, the economic practices of the Ottoman Empire were demonstrating the 
priorities of the central bureaucracy (p.30).     
The pioneers of the mercantilist concept, merchants and producers in Europe, were 
not effective on Ottoman economic policies. Even in the 17th and 18th centuries of 
the Ottoman Empire, where the influence of the regions far away from the center got 
stronger, the priorities of the central bureaucracy dominated the motives behind 
economic practices in the Ottoman Empire. As a result, Ottomans were successful 
to maintain their traditional order by ruling flexible and pragmatic. They averted the 
local regions to empower, which might harm this social order. However, starting 
from the 15th centuries, after all institutional and technological reforms and 
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transformations, Ottomans could not stop loosening of this traditional order in the 
19th century (Pamuk, 2009, p.30). 
5.5 European Capitalism 
‘Why is Duyun-i Umumiye system and state trading devastating us? State is buying 
our tobacco from 60 para and selling it from 30 kuruş (1200 para). Every state has 
debts but we are the only one having Duyun management. Why is that, every single 
day Europeans come to our lands and make fortune from our deficits? They send us 
workers like we don’t have any.’ This statement from 1895 is referred to so called 
fanatic adherents of Istanbul (G St, III HA, Nr 1100, 20 November 1895, Pera’dan 
Saurma, Bl. 2007-2008) and it summarizes to a certain extend, the effects of 
changing world economy on Ottomans under the European capitalism. While 
European economic influence was spreading all over the world, this influence 
struggled with the existing social, economical and political institutions and at the 
end, converted local institutions (Quataert, 1987, p.13). Although Ottoman Empire 
showed considerably effective resistance to European penetration in terms of capital 
and trades, the result of these attempts had seriously contributed to economical 
decline of the empire. As it is mentioned before, starting from 1820s, in rapid 
globalization period, by signing free trade agreements, Ottoman economy was 
opened to the international market and became vulnerable. Although opening into 
the world economy supposed to led Ottoman economy to grow, in opposition to that, 
it led the empire to borrow debts to cover its budget deficit emanated from the gap 
between import and export rates (Pamuk, 2008, p. XIV).  
The Industrial Revolution converted economies of Western European countries, 
started with England, into economies, which were performing low-cost and large 
amount of production. Relations with European capitalism not only brought a 
change in Ottoman economy in terms of production patterns and trade capital, but 
also brought a change in society and led to emerge new classes (Pamuk, 2008, 
p.78).  
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5.5.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
The spread of European capitalism was not only occurred by foreign trade but also 
with foreign capital investments, which were given as debts to the Third World 
countries including the Ottoman Empire. Besides, most of the European investment 
in Ottoman was oriented to infrastructure, railways, harbors and canals in order to 
expand foreign trade. In compared to that, the foreign capital investments directed 
to production activities such as agriculture, mining and industry, were limited until 
the WWI. This sector-specific dispersion shows the tendency of the foreign capital to 
support foreign trade and exports. Although before the WWI, the trade between 
Ottoman and Europe was deteriorated, foreign investment activities especially with 
France and Germany increased. While foreign direct investment was stable in early 
1860s till the late 1880s, increased rapidly between 1890 and 1914 (Quataert, 1987, 
p.18). 
5.5.2 Railroads 
Developments in transportation in the Ottoman Empire had an important place in 
commercialization of agriculture and entering into the world economy. It  enabled 
the empire to be more effective in European trade. Therefore, in 1890, Europeans 
financed the activities to broaden Izmir, Beyrut, Istanbul, Haydarpasa, Yafa and 
Hayfa harbors. Other than that, foreign investors implemented the railway network in 
the Ottoman Empire’s lands in Asia to increase overall railway network by threefold 
(Quataert, 1987, p.20).  
Infrastructure of railroads enabled Ottoman to provide domestic security, increase 
the power of central government in rural areas, decrease the transportation cost 
between Istanbul and markets in Central Anatolia, and transport equipments and 
soldiers during wars. Moreover, the government could collect agricultural taxes 
more efficiently and easily. Due to these expectations, Ottoman made concessions 
with foreign companies even in paying fees for every kilometer that was built. 
However, these payments brought extra burden to Ottomans’ economy, so railroads 
didn’t provide the benefits, which were expected. On the other hand, English, 
French, German and Austrian equity owners, who undertook the structure and 
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management of railroads, were the most profitable ones from these investments 
(Quataert, 1987, p.20). 
5.6 Efforts of Generating Income 
5.6.1 Debts 
European powers often used debts to increase their activities in Istanbul. They 
supported their investors to give debts to Ottoman Empire and they sometimes gave 
guarantees. In 1881, with the establishment of Duyun-i Umumiye, Europeans took 
the control of Ottomans’ internal affairs such as economical policies. This also gave 
a guarantee to the investors (Pamuk, 2008, p.72).  
In the 18th and 19th century, since Ottomans’ political and managerial capacity was 
limited, the financial income arriving to the center was limited too. The government 
was lack of network to gather taxes, so had to share those tax incomes with strong 
groups living in distant provinces. However, starting from 1820s, the empire 
attenuated the power of these provinces thus could control tax gatherings again. 
This led incomes to increase in real terms; nevertheless, expenditures were rising in 
that time. Therefore, the financial reorganization and centralization activities of the 
empire were managed together with long-term internal borrowing.  
Since the 16th century, the empire was taking credits from money agents, but they 
couldn’t even compensate the empire’s gradually increasing needs. Then, the 
empire started a system called esham (share certificates), a long-term internal 
borrowing. With this system, the empire was aiming to expand the base of the public 
debt, discourage equity owners instead, support small and medium size owners of 
capital. However, the empire couldn’t control or restrict selling eshams from a 
person to another. As a result, it was realized that the internal borrowing provided 
from esham system had high costs (Pamuk, 2008, p.102-103). 
Foreign Capital Invested in National Debts 
In the 19th century, plenty of foreign capital entry occurred in Ottoman Empire and 
Egypt. The major part of this capital was in terms of debts given to the other 
countries. In the pre-war (WWI) period, two third of the total foreign investments in 
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Ottoman Empire, half of the total foreign investments in Egypt has gone to national 
debt. The period between 1870s and WWI, Ottoman Empire and Egypt became the 
most indebted ones among other countries in the world. These foreign borrowings 
had many effects over both Ottomans’ and Egypt’s economies (Pamuk, 2008, p.83).  
Ottoman used most of the debts that were taken to finance military expenses and 
current expenditures. A small part of the funds were directed to railways and 
irrigation infrastructure investment projects. Britain and France perceived this 
process as a significant tool to maintain influence over the Ottoman Empire. 
Although, they were aware of Ottomans’ troubles with repaying, they encouraged 
their bankers and financial markets to issue loans. 
On the other hand, in Egypt the debts were directed to large-scale farming and 
irrigation projects. However, those projects couldn’t provide the expected yield in 
terms of production and tax income (Pamuk, 2008, p.83). 
At the end of the year 1875, the Ottoman Empire announced a partial moratorium. 
In 1876, the empire ceased the whole debt payments. Egypt had to do the same at 
the beginning of 1876. Although Ottomans’ debts diminished by 40 percent, Duyun-i 
Umumiye authority was established as a European attorney controlling Ottomans’ 
leading source of incomes. Until the end of the century, Ottomans’ loans were 
limited and under the Duyun-i Umumiye authority’s close supervision. Therefore 
repaying of the existing debts maintained in a coordinated way. However, especially 
after 1903, because of military and financial problems, Ottomans started to borrow 
again. At this time, France and Germany used their credits given, as a tool to 
reinforce their influence on Ottoman Empire. New credits for manufacturing railways 
or other essence of economic projects were given to the countries’ investors who 
lent money (Pamuk, 2008, p.85).        
Different financial and political supervision systems that Europe had built over 
Ottoman Empire provided important guarantees to the European investors. This 
supervision encouraged European capital to be invested directly after 1880. Foreign 
investments, excluding national debts, played an important role in directing to export 
and entering to the world economy (Pamuk, 2008, p.86). 
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Domestic Borrowing 
System of iltizam were being used in the domestic borrowing of Ottoman Empire 
starting from the middle ages up to the 19th and 20th centuries. Iltizam means tax 
farming in Ottoman and it allowed individuals with enough capital to have the rights 
of collecting tax revenues from a certain region in return of cash payments to the 
government. In the 15th and 16th centuries, only a limited part of the tax revenues of 
the empire were being collected by iltizam system. Knights collected the major part 
of the revenues via timar system from farmers. However, along with the changing 
war technology, the necessity of having bigger and settled armies in the center 
appeared, thus timar system started to lose its economical and military importance. 
Consequently state started to give up on timar system and focus on iltizam more 
and more. On the other hand, stalling financial circumstances empowered the 
state’s tendency to borrow more via iltizam (Pamuk, 2009, p.14). 
Along with the increasing need of borrowing, in 1695 a new system called malikane 
was applied. Malikane system allowed individuals to use their rights to collect tax 
revenues for a lifetime. In compare to short-term iltizam, the new system of 
malikane allowed state to borrow with longer-terms (Genç & Okyar & Nalbandoglu, 
1975, p. 231-296). This system had some positive economic impacts on Ottoman 
income; however, it was less than anticipated by the state. New contractors helped 
to improve productivity in the malikanes they bought, maintained security and made 
long-term investments. Nevertheless, malikane owners started to sub-contract their 
tax collecting duties to second or even third parties. Thus, this system could not help 
to reduce the burden of taxes, on the contrary increased by transferring the surplus 
(Genc, 1994, p.61).   
Eventually this system was not enough to solve the empire’s fiscal problems. When 
the owner of the rights died, it was almost impossible for the contracts to return to 
state’s control again. Thus this system did not increase tax revenues, on the 
contrary, caused to decrease. After the war between 1768 and 1774, fiscal 
bureaucracy started a new system called esham, which was mentioned before. In 
this system, state was designating the annual tax revenue in advance. This amount 
was going to be divided in many portions and each portion was going to be sold to 
numerous buyers. The tax was going to be collected by the state and esham parts 
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were going to be sold with 6 or 7 times higher prices than their annual returns. The 
fundamental motive behind esham was to distribute domestic borrowing among 
many equity owners instead of a couple of giant equity owners. However, state did 
not manage to control internal trading of these esham parts between equity owners, 
thus after the first owners died, the inheritors of the owners were continuing to earn 
from the state. This was why the benefits of the esham system were limited. In the 
period of over 50 years, the bureaucracy tried to end this expensive way of 
borrowing during economic revivals, on the contrary they tried to expand this system 
at all expenses during recessions (Pamuk, 2009, p.15). 
Another phase in Ottomans’ domestic borrowing was started in 1830 along with the 
increasing military expenses and reform attempts. The empire started to use special 
sales notes called kaime in order to afford its expenditures when the financial 
resources depleted. These sales notes were 8-year time loans with 12,5 interest 
rate by the time they were launched. However, when the interest was ceased to be 
in effect in Ottoman Empire, these sale notes lost their functions (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.15). 
In the 18th century, there were many developments in terms of public financing, tax 
collecting and institutions dealing with domestic borrowing, however, it is important 
to note that the developments in private finance sector was limited because of 
religious reasons, which is going to be mentioned later. It should be noted that, the 
institutional changes in private finance field affected operations of non-Muslims who 
were involved with Europe not Muslim businessmen’s (Pamuk, 2009, p.16). 
Ottoman Empire’s Foreign Borrowing Experience 
It has been questioned why Ottoman chose foreign debt, instead of debasing or 
internal borrowing, to finance its budget deficit during 70 years especially after 1850. 
In the 19th century, internal loan market was small compared to national debt 
necessity; so long-term internal borrowing was not a good alternative. Although, 
Ottoman Empire used debasing up until the end of the 18th century, debasing 
system was no more practical in the 19th century. Therefore, Ottomans had only one 
option remained; foreign debts (Pamuk, 2008, p.113). 
The first foreign debt was provided from French banks by the mediation of Galata 
bankers for short-term. Government was hesitating to start long-term foreign 
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borrowing. However, after the Crimean war, borrowing from European money 
market started. Between 1854 and 1876, Ottoman borrowed large amount of debts 
with higher interests compared to other countries. These borrowings used to finance 
current account deficit, renovate palaces, establish a huge navy and compensate 
bureaucracy’s salaries instead of reviving the economy and investments to increase 
financial income. Therefore, Ottomans borrowed money to finance its debts and 
their interests. While, repaying process was gradually getting difficult for Ottoman 
Empire, Europe was yielding from this situation (Pamuk, 2008, p.119-120). 
5.6.2 Debasement 
Fiscal Deficits and Debasing the Coinage 
Fiscal deficits resulted mostly from wars were problem for many European countries 
in modern period (1500-1800). However, in the 19th century this problem seemed to 
be diminished. Ottomans’ budget started to show deficit after the 16th century during 
wars and gradually enlarged in the 18th and 19th centuries. Those budget deficits in 
war periods and activities to finance them created great pressure on Ottoman 
economy.  
Ottomans’ budget deficit started to enlarge at the end of 1760s and culminated in 
1820s and 1830s. In that case, the government tried to raise its control over the 
income sources, tried internal borrowing and invoked debasing when the pressures 
peaked (Pamuk, 2008, p.97-98).  
18th century is relatively a peaceful, stable and prosperous period for Ottoman 
Empire till the end of 1760s. The data shows us that, in this period, the empire made 
a lot of investments in agriculture and handicrafts areas in Anatolia and Balkans 
(Genc, 1984, p.52-61). In addition to that, the trade between Ottoman Empire and 
Middle and Western Europe -through the Mediterranean Sea by land route- 
increased significantly. This period was also a stable period from financial side. 
Ottomans’ financial data shows that the empire’s budget was in balance till the end 
of 1760s, even there were sometimes budget surpluses (Pamuk, 2008, p.99). 
Wars between 1768 and 1774 with Russia and wars between 1787 and 1792 with 
both Russia and Habsburg Ruling House shook Ottomans’ economy. Not after the 
first war but after the second war, Ottomans diminished the ratio of gram silver in 
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coin (kurus) by one third. With debasing, the government invited the public to hand 
in the silver they have at a price determined under the market (Pamuk, 2008, 
p.100).  
In 60 years period, Ottomans’ kurus devaluated 90 percent in opposition to the other 
leading monetary units. Under the royalty of Mahmut II, Ottoman Empire produced 
many gold coins in different standards. The ratio of debasement was less in gold 
coins than silver ones. In 30 years period the ratio of valuable metal in gold coins 
didn’t go beyond 20 percent. The empire’s approach to the gold was different than 
silver. The most important reason behind was that; the empire was paying its 
expenditures by silver coins. Therefore, debasing gold coins didn’t bring much 
benefit to the empire (Pamuk, 2008, p.104). 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Debasement 
Debasement was seen as a tool that provide financial income to the empire in short-
term. Although, debasing increased the empire’s income, it also increased the 
inflation. In another words, debasing affected price levels to go up. This effect might 
be explained by the quantity theory of money. The quantity theory of money is the 
proposition that in the long run, an increase in the quantity of money brings an equal 
percentage increase in the price levels (Parkin, 2003, p.643). Since debasement 
allowed the empire to issue more money by reducing the silver amount for each 
unit, it has similar effects of increasing the quantity of money. According to the 
theory, money growth and inflation are correlated. But the correlation between 
money growth and inflation cannot prove that money growth causes inflation. One 
possible third factor is a large and persistent government budget deficit that gets 
financed by creating money (ibid.). There are some historical evidences, which allow 
us to test this assumption. Apart from the Ottoman Empire’s situation, World War II 
and the following years could be another occasion. Rapid money growth during war 
years allowed price levels to rise immediately after the war. The consequence of 
wartime rapid money growth was severe postwar inflation (Parkin, 2003, p.647). The 
results of upward shifting price levels after debasements in order to finance budget 
deficits in the Ottoman Empire could be another evidence as well.  
As the inflation increased, the income decreased gradually in time. In order to 
prevent that, the empire should renew the debasement process and raise taxes. 
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However, in case the public realizes that the empire would renew the debasement 
process, they would lose their trust to the monetary unit, which could make the 
things even more difficult for the empire to provide additional income. Then, people 
would want to hold foreign coins instead of their own kurus. This case was 
happened first in the beginning of the 17th century and then under the royalty of 
Mahmut II. A drift had happened from kurus to the foreign coins in the markets. 
Another disadvantage of debasing was increased difficulty for the empire to borrow 
from domestic market. Since the domestic market expected that the empire would 
renew the debasement process, they forwent to lend money or demanded more 
interest (Pamuk, 2008, p.105-106). 
A New Strategy: Stable Money 
19th century was different in terms of Ottoman economy and monetary history. In 
this century, Western style reforms were done not only in education, law and justice 
but also management, economy, finance and money. Furthermore, integration with 
the world market was provided, and foreign trade with Europe made Ottoman 
economy to grow faster in exports. European countries especially Britain, were 
considering that Ottoman should make reforms to provide regional integration. 
European countries were thinking that gradually increasing trade relationships 
between Europe and Ottoman Empire and direct investments were necessary for 
Ottomans’ economic growth. Due to that, stable money was seen as a requirement 
for growth in reforms and international trade. Thus, Europeans especially Britain, 
leaned on Ottomans to create more stable money system (Pamuk, 2008, p.109-
110). 
From 1850s to WWI, Ottomans didn’t use debasement, so relative monetary stability 
was achieved and foreign borrowing became the basic tool to finance budget 
deficits. In these activities, there was a European encouragement and their desire to 
make Ottomans more trustful in European financial markets.  
What was the result of these changes in the 19th century? The positive 
developments were; monetary stability, quick growth in foreign trade and direct 
investments of Europe. However, in 1881 by the establishment of Duyun-i Umumiye 
in the Ottoman Empire led the significant income sources captured by European 
investors, thus Ottomans became indebted in large amounts before financial 
balance was built (Pamuk, 2008, p.115). 
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5.7 Prices and Wages 
There are some gaps in the Ottoman history, and the history of prices is one of 
them. However, it is vital to understand these data and comparisons for different 
periods of time in order to comprehend the economic history of the empire. It is the 
fact that, there is a strong and bi-directional correlation between monetary and 
economic situations. Monetary stability usually leads to the expansion in trade and 
production. Monetary instability or monetary difficulties affects credits, production 
and trade negatively. Furthermore, economic prosperity or any expansion in 
economic activities contribute to an increase in the fiscal income of the state and 
maintain monetary stability. Consequently, it may well be argued that there is a 
strong causal correlation between price tendencies and economic situations 
(Pamuk, 2009, p.104). 
5.7.1 Prices and Inflation 
Researches show that the most rapid debasement and inflation period were around 
the beginning of the 19th century by the time wars, rebellions and reforms were 
taking place throughout the empire. According to Pamuk’s work (2009), in the 
medium and long run, prices in the cities outside the capital was moving along with 
the prices in the capital city; Istanbul. In terms of silver grams, it is observed that the 
prices in the capital were also moving along with the prices around Mediterranean. 
This shows that, the empire was strongly connected to the thousand miles away 
markets and economies depending on the weight of maritime trade (p.104). 
In the research of Pamuk, over 6 thousand book of accounts and price lists such as 
narh lists for standard goods for Istanbul and less for other cities in the Prime 
Ministry’s Ottoman Archives are used and price series for four and a half centuries 
are formed. These narh lists were made by local authorities to determine the prices 
of fundamental goods in the empire. According to the records dating from the 15th 
century to the 19th century, it is observed that these lists were not published 
periodically or continuously but especially after the 16th century they were published 
during poverty, recessions or instability periods. However during stable periods, we 
understood that these lists were not prepared for up to 30 years (Pamuk, 2009, 
p.10). As it is observed from the table in the appendix figure 2, the consumer prices 
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in the empire increased by 300 times starting from the year 1496 until the World 
War I. That means 1,3 percent annual increase in average (Pamuk, 2009, p.110). 
Indexes showed that from the mid of the 16th century until the mid of the 17th 
century, prices increased five fold and it seems that Istanbul experienced a severe 
inflation period along these years.  
The price increase in this period usually explained by price revolution, which refers 
most specifically to the high rate of inflation that characterized the period across 
Western Europe, with prices on average rising perhaps six fold over 150 years 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_revolution). However, Pamuk argued that 
Ottoman prices increased mainly because of debasements in this period (2009, 
p.110).  
The figures also indicate that there was another and more severe inflation wave 
starting from the end of the 18th century and extended until 1850 in the empire. In 
this second period, prices increased twelve to fifteen folds. And these second climbs 
in the prices could be explained by mainly debasements, which started from 1780 
and accelerated during the sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). However, the overall 
price level in Istanbul remained more stable during 1650-1780 and 1860-1914.  
 
 
Figure 3: Consumer Prices in Istanbul 1469-1914 (in terms of nominal prices) 
Source: Pamuk, 2009, p.112 
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Figure 4: Consumer Prices in Istanbul, 1469-1914 (in terms of gram silver; 1469=1,0) 
Source: Pamuk, 2009, p.113 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Food Prices in Ottoman cities, Istanbul, 1469-1865 (1469=1,0) 
Source: Pamuk, 2009, p.114 
 
On the other hand, according to Ljuben Berov’s price data gathered from the 
Balkans during 16th and 17th centuries showed that prices increased in a similar 
manner (1976). All these data showed that from the Balkans to the Anatolia and 
Syria, all Ottoman money zones have similar price tendencies. When we look at the 
price indexes from Egypt formed by Andre Raymond, it is observed that prices in 
terms of gram silver in Cairo between the years 1624 and 1800 moved parallel to 
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the other Ottoman cities. It may be argued that sea trade and transportation was the 
reason behind similar price movements around East Mediterranean region (Pamuk, 
2009, p.110).  
5.7.2 Reasons of Price Movements and its Results 
According to Pamuk, although there were various reasons behind price changes 
such as the quality of harvest, wars etc., the main reason was debasements. The 
main reason behind debasement was the intention of raising extra fund for the state. 
The relation between price level and debasements could be observed better when 
the amount of silver in Ottoman money is tracked after the year 1450. The graph 
showed that the fastest decrease in the amount of silver in money happened at the 
end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, and later at the end of 
the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century.  
However, there were some slight changes in the amount of silver during 1650-1770 
and never changed again after 1844. When the two graphs, figure 3 and figure 6, 
are analyzed together, the correlation between debasements and changing price 
levels could be observed easily (Pamuk, 2007, p.114). 
 
Figure 6: Content of Gram Silver in Ottoman monetary unit 
Source: Pamuk, 2007, p.112 
 
As it is stated before, for four and a half hundred years, the nominal prices 
increased by 300 fold in the empire, however, when prices are expressed in silver 
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grams it is interesting and important to observe that the movement remained 
between narrow intervals. The gram silver prices increased by 60 percent during the 
Price Revolution, however, it dropped at the first half of the 18th century. Later than 
that, until the second half of the 19th century, gram silver prices increased by only 
two fold. This shows us that the silver inflation contributed to the overall price level 
in the empire, but beside the effects of the debasements, Pamuk argues that the 
silver inflation effect were insignificant (ibid). In another words, it is concluded that 
the main reason behind price movements in the empire was mainly debasements. 
Debasements in the empire had similar symptoms of printing money in 
governments. It reduces the value of money and this invariably causes inflation. 
Debasements decrease the amount of gram silver in Ottoman coins thus reduces its 
value, which leads to an increase in price levels. Although silver as a currency was 
loosing value alone, its effects on prices were insignificant beside the effects of 
debasements. 
5.7.3 Price Comparisons with Europe 
According to Robert Allen’s research (2001), which includes vast amount of price 
data, in terms of gram silver, from Europe gathered from Middle Ages up to the 
World War I, leads us to different questions and interesting observations (p. 411-
47).  
The research showed that in the first half of the 16th century the prices in the South 
Europe were higher than any other parts of Europe. In a similar manner, the prices 
in Istanbul around these dates were highest among all other European cities.  
 
Figure 7: 
Consumer Prices  in 
European cities, 1450-
1913 (in terms of gram 
silver; Strasbourg 1700-
49=1,0) Source: Pamuk, 
2007, p. 117 
Istanbul 
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Another point is that the prices in Istanbul in terms of gram silver increased in a 
slower pace than other cities of the Europe up to 1650. After Price Revolution, the 
price levels in Istanbul started to remain lower than Mediterranean and European 
price levels. This incident has occurred around the same date when difference of 
income per capita levels between Ottoman Empire and North Europe increased. In 
the later centuries, the Ottoman price levels were still lower than European levels. 
These long term price movements showed that just like today, the prices in the 
countries with high income per capita are tend to be high as well. Starting from the 
16th century, while the level of income per capita were increasing in Northwest 
Europe, the price levels increased faster than Southern Europe and Ottoman 
Empire price levels. It is important to note that, in the 18th and 19th centuries the 
most expensive city of Europe in terms of gram silver was London, which was the 
city with highest income per capita in Europe as well (Pamuk, 2007, p.119).       
5.7.4 Wages in Europe and the Ottoman Empire 
For the last 20 years, the economists and economic historians put a lot of efforts to 
distinguish different countries’ per capita production and income levels and the 
tendencies of the differences between ’leaders’ and ’followers’. It is the fact that the 
difference between these levels of the countries was so small or equal before the 
Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth, although today the gap is huge 
(Pamuk, 2007, p.155).  
The research of Angus Maddison (2001) shows that this difference was an actual 
fact in the year 1820. Furthermore, the difference between developed and 
developing countries was not only increasing during the Industrial Revolution but 
also during 1914 and 1950.  
In order to analyze per capita income and level of living standards of a country, an 
alternative way is to compare real wage rates of the workers in specific regions of 
this country. A decrease in wage rates means, less consumer products per worker 
or less prosperity for this worker’s family. Pamuk (2009) conducted a research in 
which over 5000 account books of construction projects of the empire are used to 
form accurate wage data. In figure 8 attached in the appendix, the real daily wage 
rates are presented for regular and skilled workers.  
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It is difficult to distinguish the effects of institutional factors and market situation over 
daily wages. However, it is still observed that in the periods of fast debasements, 
the wages dropped first and moved upward afterwards. This proves to some extent 
the process of formation of daily wages is connected to the market structure. The 
indexes shows that the wage rates of regular construction workers in the Ottoman 
Empire decreased by 30 to 40 percent in the 16th century, slightly changed during 
the 18th century, increased by 30 percent until the mid-19th century and again 
increased by 40 percent later at the end of the 19th century up to the beginning of 
the 20th century. Wages of the regular workers were 20 percent higher before the 
World War I in compare to its levels around 1500. It is also observed that real wage 
rates of skilled workers in 1914 were 50 percent higher than the level in 1500 since 
the difference between regular and skilled worker in terms of wages started to 
increase at the end of the 19th century (p.172). 
5.7.5 Wage Comparisons with Europe 
Pamuk’s research (2009) shows that wages in terms of gram silver in Istanbul and 
East-Mediterranean cities at the beginning of the 16th century were so close to the 
wage levels in North and South Europe. However, at the same period of time, the 
price levels in terms of gram silver in Istanbul were highest among all other 
European cities in the research thus the real wages in Istanbul were between 60 
and 90 percent of other European cities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Real 
Wages of Regular  
Construction Worker 
in European Cities 
(wages in terms of 
gram silver/CPI) 
Source: Pamuk, 
2007, p.174 
Istanbul 
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Figure 10: Real Wages of Skilled Worker in European Cities (wages in terms of gram silver/CPI) 
Source: Pamuk, 2007, p.174 
                                     Istanbul 
 
Real wages were intended to decline in most of the European cities just like in 
Istanbul. It is interesting that, although the real wages had a declining trend after 
1600 in European cities, in Istanbul they slightly changed until the end of the 18th 
century. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the wages in Istanbul had a tendency to get 
close to the levels in Northwestern Europe. However, the difference in wage rates 
(from 1/3 to 1/2) between Istanbul and Northwest Europe continued until the 
Industrial Revolution (p.173). 
When the price rates in Istanbul were compared to West Holland in the first half of 
the 16th century, it is observed that prices in Istanbul was higher than West Holland 
by 60 to 80 percent. During two hundred years after that, nominal wages following 
prices in terms of gram silver have increased by 250 percent in West Holland. 
However in Istanbul, prices in gram silver almost did not change and real wages 
declined slightly (Pamuk, 2007, p.173). 
Real wage rates in Istanbul increased by approximately 66 percent beginning from 
the last quarter of the 18th century until the World War I. As a result, the difference 
between Istanbul and Northwestern European cities, in terms of wages, increased 
after the Industrial Revolution. Before the World War I, the wages of the regular 
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construction workers in London were 2,7 times higher than in Istanbul. This was 1,9 
for Amsterdam and 1,6 for Paris (Pamuk, 2007, p.174).        
All of these results guided us towards three important conclusions. First, the real 
wages in Ottoman cities in 1750 were lower than it was in 1500. However, this 
deterioration was not as big as it was in Europe around these dates. Consequently, 
until the mid of the 18th centuries, real wages in Istanbul and any other Ottoman 
cities were so close to the real wages in many cities of Europe. Second is that, 
comparisons shows that real wages in Northwestern Europe were higher than 
Istanbul’s levels at the beginning of the 16th century and this situation remained 
same until the Industrial Revolution. The third is that, after the Industrial Revolution 
especially after 1850, the real wages in most of the European cities had tendency to 
increase. At the same period, real wages in Western Europe increased more than 
Eastern Mediterranean and the difference between the wage levels increased as 
well (Pamuk, 2007, p.175). 
5.8 Long Depression (1873 – 1896) 
Evidences for both industrialized countries and the world economy show that, the 
period between 1873 and 1896 was different than both the quick growth period from 
the mid 19th century to 1873, and the period from then till the WWI. However, the 
information about the other neighborhood countries is limited. According to the study 
that Hanson conducted, at the end of 19th century, it is seen that exports didn’t grow 
faster, and foreign trade slowed down. Hanson, do not want to refer this slowing 
down as long depression in industrialized countries and decline in the growth speed 
of demand. He introduces “unspecified structural changes” largely caused to the 
decline in exports of underdeveloped countries and growth speed of world trade 
(1980). 
5.8.1 Long Term Activities in terms of Foreign Trade 
In the 19th century Ottomans’ foreign trade was depended on exports of basic 
products and imports of finished goods. In the last quarter of the century, the export 
of grain, rice and sugar became important (Aybar, 1939 & Issawi, 1988). Between 
1780 and 1830, the growth speed of trade relationship between Ottoman Empire 
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and Europe was under 1,5 percent (Issawi, 1966, p.30 & Paris, 1957, p.572-577 & 
Masson, 1911). Compared to that, in the 19th century, according to the calculations 
made by current prices and 1880’s fixed prices, the growth speed of exports and 
imports was approximately over 5 percent. The free trade agreement signed 
between Ottomans and European countries in 1838 played a significant role in 
Ottomans’ entrance to the world market. The foreign trade share of Western-
Eastern Europe and USA was over 70 percent in 1870s (Pamuk, 1978, p.36-37). 
The growth speed of Ottoman foreign trade was clearly low in 1880s and 1890s. As 
it is seen from the table (figure 11), increase in the scale of imports and exports 
calculated by fixed prices of 1880 were under 3 percent per annum between the 
periods 1879-81 and 1897-99. When the growth and exchange ratio is calculated by 
current prices, exports deteriorated by 0,9 percent per annum between the periods 
1879-80 and 1887-88. Between the periods 1887-88 and 1898-99, a recovery 
happened so; year-to-year growth rate became 1,2 percent between the periods 
1879-81 and 1897-99. Year-to-year growth rate in imports calculated by current 
prices became 0,6 percent through the recovery process (Pamuk, 2008, p.128). 
 
Figure 11: Growth Speed of Ottoman Foreign Trade (prices in terms of pound sterling) 
Source: Pamuk, 2008, p.127 
 
Exports Imports 
Years 
Current Prices 1880 Prices Current Prices 1880 Prices 
1839/41-
1852/54 
5,3 5,3 5,5 6,4 
1857/59-
1871/73 
5,0 6,2 4,9 5,2 
1879/81-
1897/99 
1,2 2,7 0,6 2,5 
1879/80-
1887/88 
0,9 2,8 -0,8 2,0 
1887/88-
1898/99 
2,3 2,2 1,4 2,7 
1897/99-
1905/07 
4,3 3,4 6,0 4,3 
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The slowing down process in Ottoman foreign trade didn’t affect the allocation of 
trade among countries. The share of industrialized Western-Eastern European 
countries and the USA continued to increase relative to Ottomans’. Germany started 
to expand its share in Ottoman foreign trade with respect to Great Britain in 1880s. 
However, Great Britain maintained its position as having the biggest share in 
Ottomans’ exports and imports until 1913 (Pamuk, 1978, Section 2). It is only 
possible to compare total trade numbers until 1907 because, the empire had lost 
one fourth of its population living in European region, developed in trade and 
agriculture and had higher living standards, and lost over 10 percent of its land in 
1908 (Eldem, 1970, p.56-62). However in 1913, the empire caught the export level 
of 1907 again, and import level exceeded by 25 percent of its levels in 1907s 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.126-129).                 
The Ottoman Empire was a small country in terms of international trade. Tobacco 
was the only product that Ottoman had an important share in the world trade. Still, 
the total share of this product in export didn’t exceed 10 percent until 1913 (Eldem, 
1970, p.134). Since Ottoman economy couldn’t affect the prices of imports and 
exports by itself, foreign trade prices were accepted as the data for Ottoman 
economy. One of the reasons for the negative disposition of Ottomans’ terms of 
trade during the long depression was, rapid and constant decrease in world wheat 
prices. Between 1873 and 1894, wheat production in the USA increased by 350 
percent and USA got ahead of the total production of Western Europe and Russia. 
As the USA entered into the international market, wheat prices decreased 60 
percent between 1873 and 1894. This decrease in prices affected the economy of 
Ottoman Empire, as a producer of wheat, negatively. These developments in wheat 
prices ruined small and medium peasants who produce wheat. Since 90 percent of 
Ottomans’ land was cultivated with wheat and one-fourth of tax incomes were 
coming from agricultural production, the empire’s economy affected badly (Shaw, 
1975, p.451-453). 
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5.8.2 Long Term Dispositions in Foreign Investments 
As it is briefly introduced in figure 12, in 20 years period before 1874 direct 
investments in Ottoman Empire was limited. In this period, most of the foreign 
investments were invested in railways as it is mentioned before. In response to that, 
the amount invested to Ottomans’ foreign debts was high and gradually rising. In 
compared to 1854-1864 periods, between 1865 and 1874 Ottomans’ level of 
indebtedness to European finance markets increased. Repaying of these debts 
gradually became difficult. Announcement of partially moratorium was after the 1873 
crisis. When flow of capital from industrialized countries to their neighborhood 
ceased, Ottoman Empire was unable to pay its debts (Pamuk, 2008, p.131). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
State Debt 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Total Flow 
Years 
Capital 
Flow 
related 
with New 
Loans 
Total Debt 
Payments 
Net New 
Investment 
Profit 
Transfers 
Capital 
Flows 
(1)=(3) 
Debt 
Payments 
and Profit 
Transfers 
(2)=(4) 
Net 
(5)-(6) 
1854-1875 4,7 3,1 0,6 0,2 5,2 3,3 2,0 
1880-1898 0,9 2,8 2,3 1,1 3,1 3,9 -0,8 
1899-1913 2,7 4,6 1,4 2,7 4,1 7,2 -3,1 
1854-1864 2,0 0,8 0,4 0,04 2,4 0,8 1,6 
1865-1875 7,3 5,4 0,8 0,3 8,1 5,8 2,3 
1876-1879 0,7 0,6 0,04 0,3 0,7 0,9 -0,2 
1880-1887 0,8 2,1 0,3 0,7 1,1 2,8 -1,7 
1888-1898 0,9 3,4 3,7 1,3 4,6 4,7 -0,1 
Figure 12: Estimated Fund Flows Emanated From Foreign Investments in The Ottoman Empire (annual 
averages; million pound sterling) Source: Pamuk, 2008, p.132 
 
5.8.3 Changes in Production Level 
What could it be said for Ottomans’ economic performance between 1873 and 
1896? Could it be said that, the basic disposition of this period was a decline in total 
production growth speed, as it was contending for industrialized countries? Or, was 
it more serious than that? First of all, neither in composition of total production nor in 
Ottomans’ international division of labor, there wasn’t any substantial change. On 
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the contrary to industrialization, agricultural economy and expertise in exporting of 
agricultural products were gradually increased. There wasn’t any revival in 
handicraft activities. In direct contradiction, the production of handicraft was 
decreased (Pamuk, 2008, p.134).              
To sum up, two main points show how Ottomans’ economy was influenced by the 
developments in the world economy;  
1. After the establishment of Duyun-i Umumiye, European capital had control 
over Ottomans’ economy, and repaying foreign debts affected finance and 
economy negatively. 
2. Regression in terms of trade, and decline in growth rate, along with rapid 
decline in global wheat prices, had influence on Ottomans’ economic 
performance negatively (Pamuk, 2008, p.136-137). 
5.9 Demography 
5.9.1 Education 
Since Ottoman Empire included many people differ in ethnicity and religion, the 
educational system was complicated. For instance, heirs to the throne of Ottomans, 
commanders and government officers were educated in enderun universities where 
they could take physical training, Islamic education, learn palace (saray) activities in 
practice and specialize in one of the branches of art. Education for the rest of the 
Muslims was controlled by the ulema, a clergy formed by people who have studied 
Islamic sciences. Besides, foreign people were allowed to open their own schools 
next to churches, which were controlled by patriarchates independent from the 
empire.  
According to some of the modern intellectuals in Ottoman, religion was limiting 
secular knowledge of education. “Rather than teaching the ideals of the French 
Revolution and Enlightenment-inspired individualism, schools continued as vehicles 
for religio-moral social disciplining” (Encyclopedia Britannica: Ottoman Empire). 
Misinterpretation of Islam inhibited education of women. Therefore, this led to a 
decline in human capital. The effect of the diminishing human capital due to limited 
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education in Ottoman Empire on its economic decline, can be explained by Romer’s 
statement defining human capital as a key determinant of economic growth. 
Together with Tanzimat, from 1870 to the early 1880s, Ottoman education system 
was relieved by modernization and secularization in the sense of esteeming non-
religious knowledge (Salmoni, 2002). However, since the empire was limited in 
terms of financing education, progress of reforms in educational system was slow. 
5.9.2 Population 
There are several different data about Ottomans’ population. According to the most 
reliable data, the total population of the empire was 17,134,000 in 1884, 17,381,670 
in 1893, 19.050.000 in 1897, 28.652.000 in 1910 and increased gradually, then 
reached to 29,357,000 in 1913 (Bilginin Adresi: Ottomans population and Regime, 
2008)  
Population is another factor that distinguishes the difference between the developed 
and developing countries, because population growth is exogenous and has an 
impact on economic growth. However, it is important to recall classical growth model 
where population growth is endogenous. Following Thomas Malthus (1798) as it is 
depicted in figure 13, growth in food supplies couldn’t keep pace with the growth in 
population so that it led to a decline in per capita income (Todaro, 1997, p.202-203). 
Lower per capita income brings poverty, diseases and starvation. This argument is 
also related with 
saving rates. As the 
income per capita 
decreases, saving 
rates decrease, which 
leads slowing down in 
economic growth 
process as it is stated 
in neoclassical growth 
model.    
 
    Figure 13: The Malthusian Population Trap, Source: Todaro, 1997, p.204 
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In the 19th century, Ottomans’ population reached to its peak level and, the 
economic growth of the empire declined. However, it would be a mistake by 
explaining the decline in economic growth only with population growth. 
Technological change is one of the points that the Malthus model has ignored. With 
the advance in technology, machineries could take the place from human or animal 
power, which would increase productivity and quality, thus brings an upward shift to 
income level. 
 
Figure 14: How Technological and Social Progress Allows Nations to Avoid the Population Trap 
Source: Todaro, 1997, p.206 
 
The second point, which was ignored in the model, is the relationship between the 
population growth rates and levels of per capita income. As it is shown in the graph 
(figure 14), there is no definite relationship between population growth rate and per 
capita income levels.    
As a conclusion, it would be incomplete to say that the population growth caused 
Ottoman Empire to experience an economic decline, because, after the Industrial 
Revolution, Ottomans couldn’t keep pace with the technological developments 
occurred in the world. However, even the empire could have kept pace with the 
advanced technology, since the education level of Ottoman women was low, they 
couldn’t contribute to household income (Todaro, 1997, p.211). Therefore, as it was 
stated in neoclassical growth model, the opportunity cost of having a child became 
low. Besides, children were mostly seen as an investment and future labors for the 
parents, which would provide economic benefits during the 19th century. 
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5.9.3 Ethnicity 
Ottomans didn’t have a homogenous population. There were several different ethnic 
and religious groups. Determining the size of all the ethnic groups was difficult in the 
light of limited data about the 19th century. However, there were four largest ethnic 
groups, which formed most of the population; and those were Turks (10 millions), 
Arabs (6 millions), Kurds (1.5 millions), Greeks (1.5 millions), and Armenians 
(between 1.5 and 2 million)  (Encyclopedia Britannica: Ottoman Empire). Even the 
rulers of the empire could have different ethnic origins because of harem, which 
contained women brought from various countries. The sultan of the empire chose 
his wife among those foreign women, so the heir of the throne could have a different 
ethnic origin.  
Although, there were many diverse ethnic and religious groups, the empire identified 
itself with a common ethnic background, history, culture and language. While doing 
this, the Ottoman Empire was tolerant to different beliefs and cultures. Non-Muslims 
were allowed to go to churches and perpetuate their cultures. Therefore, they could 
develop their own nationalisms. Before 1850, Ottomans had sought to organize the 
various ethnic and religious communities into a smaller number of religious nations, 
called millets; in which each of the millets organized, funded, and administered its 
own religious and educational institutions (Encyclopedia Britannica: Millet). For 
some economists and historians, this separatism was one of the fundamental 
reasons for the end of Ottoman Empire. Since the empire established non-patriotic, 
non-loyal millet system, during war periods the empire was lack of support from 
most of the minority groups (ibid.).  
Like the ethnicity in the empire, the religion was also equally diverse. There were 
Christians of various denominations, and also Armenian and Greek Orthodox 
Catholics. There was a diverse but small population of Jews as well. Within the 
Ottoman Islamic community, there were adherents of Sunni Islam and out-
numbered adherents of Shiʿism. However, during the 19th century, Islam became 
the predominant religion in the empire, just as Turks became the dominant ethnic 
group. By 1914, about 83 percent of the population practiced Islam (Encyclopedia 
Britannica: Ottoman Empire). 
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Paul and Feng (2005) explain that, diversity in both ethnicity and religion has effects 
on economic growth in most of the countries in the world. Diversity in ethnic and 
religious groups creates ideological conflicts, which play a major role in social 
instability that affects economic development of a nation negatively. Social instability 
is associated with poor economic performance and high economic inequality (Nettle, 
Grace, Choisy, Cornell, Guégan, et al. 2007). 
5.9.4 Religion 
Before speculating about the effects of the dominant religion on different issues like 
finance, society etc. in the empire, it would be right thing to start trying to get 
acquainted with the major religion, Islam first. Islam as a word formed by two 
different root words, which are silm and selam in Arabic language. The first one 
literally means peace and the second one means happiness. That tells us that the 
religion of Islam by its name should be a religion of peace, happiness and wellbeing. 
Unfortunately it is observed in today’s world that these values do not reflect upon 
the land of the geography of this religion (Ozturk, 1997, p.8). 
According to a Turkish theologian, lawyer, columnist and a former member of 
Turkish parliament, who is selected as one of the top 10 influential people of the 
century by Time Magazine; Yasar Nuri Ozturk (1997), this is mainly because of 
corruption starting from the death of the prophet Muhammed by Arab-Umayyad 
intervention and it is deepened by hundreds of different sects and cliques in the 
history. He claimed that during Umayyad caliphate many superstitions and false 
beliefs are ascribed to the prophet Muhammed and most of the traditions and 
customs are served to the society as Islam or the practice of the prophet (p.9). 
It is important to note that the speculations below about the effects of Islam in 
Ottoman Empire cannot reflect the real religion itself since many of the practices 
were products of this historical corruption and not reflecting the original content of 
Qur’an. 
Islam and its Effects on Finance 
It is a popular debate as if the religion of Islam suppresses the improvement of 
credit relations in Islamic societies by banning interest profit. On the other hand, in 
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the absence of deposit banking, many observations from outside concluded that 
there are no financial institutions and instruments in Islamic societies. It is true that 
there is a religious ban in both Muslim and Christian societies in order to prevent 
usury around Mediterranean in the Middle Ages (Pamuk, 2007, p.6).   
However, as it is in Islam, riba in Arabic, which means usury is strictly banned not 
the interest. Interest income at the inflation rate could only compensate loss on 
wealth due to the inflation. Islam and almost all religions are against ill-gotten gains 
and this is why usury is banned. Interest is to protect wealth against inflation thus it 
would be inconceivable to consider interest as banned by Islam.  
Although interest was frequently criticized among many traditional Islamic parties, 
eventually Ottomans did not find it against Islam. Religious consensus maintained 
their pragmatic approach and they concluded that if something is beneficial for 
Islamic society, it is also beneficial for Islam as well. Consequently, it was not 
difficult for Ottomans to develop financial institutions and instruments in the Middle 
Ages (Pamuk, 2007, p.6).   
Research of Ronald Jennings (1973) shows that there was an intense credit 
relationships between money lenders and debt raisers during the 16th centuries 
around Anatolia and it is observed that interest was applied to all of these credits 
according to the records. Interest rate was fluctuating between 10 and 20 percent 
annually around these dates. However, it is important to note that there was some 
differences about the credits with interest and its incidence vary according to 
different geographies of the empire. These regional differences considering the 
practice of interest shows us that Islam was interpreted more strictly in Arabian 
provinces than Anatolian provinces (Çizakça, 2000). 
5.9.5 State and Society Relations 
Ottomans’ economic policies and the structure of its institutions depended on the 
characteristics of the relationship between state and society. Different social groups, 
segments in the empire were constantly trying to affect state policies and they were 
trying to secure their benefits. In the Ottoman society, up until the end of the 15th 
century, there were intensive conflicts between Turkish originated aristocracy living 
in the provinces of the empire and bureaucracy in the central government. After 
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Sultan Mehmed II, state confiscated the lands under private property and power 
shifted to the bureaucracy in the center. This was the end of aristocracy based on 
lands possessed. After this reform the effect of landowners, merchants and 
moneylenders on state’s economic policies became limited (Pamuk, 2007, p.9). 
In spite of increasing power and influence of the elites living in provinces, it is 
interesting that the most important characteristic of the Ottoman order in the 18th 
centuries, which is the state ownership of the land, was not changed at all. Thanks 
to this, central bureaucracy maintained its existence up until the 19th century. The 
partnership based on sharing tax revenues was going to be re-arranged in favor of 
the central bureaucracy with sultan Mahmud II and Tanzimat. In the 19th century, 
central government got stronger and the ones collecting tax on behalf of the state 
got weaker (Pamuk, 2007, p.16).          
5.10 Economic and Fiscal Institutions 
The most important ecEonomic institution in classical period Ottoman society was 
timar without any doubt. System of timar was furnishing an army relying on special 
knights called sipahi by collecting tax revenues from peasants working on state-
owned lands. The sipahi was the holder of the land granted directly by the Ottoman 
sultan, and was entitled to all of the income from that land, in return for military 
service during wartime and maintaining public security in peacetime. Thereby timar 
was not only an important institution for organization of land ownership but also a 
key one regarding fiscal and military systems.  
However, Ottomans did not put efforts to establish their genuine institutions in all 
conquered territories. It is known that Ottomans gave importance to collect tax 
revenues and did not interfere to existing rules and organizations to a large extent in 
the distant geographies such as East Anatolia, Baghdad, Basra, Egypt, Yemen, 
Wallachia, Moldavia, Georgia and Northwest Africa (Pamuk, 2007, p.5). 
It is the fact that Ottomans preferred to accept existing institutions and legislations in 
these places instead of forcing to replace with Ottoman institutions and legislations 
(Barkan, 1942 & Akgunduz, 1990-94, p.180-85).  
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For example, when it comes to monetary in the Ottomans, they preferred to live with 
the existing monetary units in the new conquered lands with minor changes like just 
printing the name of Ottoman sultan on it.         
The important reason behind keeping the pace of institutional change limited in 
distant provinces, was not to cause economic, social and political disturbance. On 
the other hand, it was not certain that central government had enough fiscal and 
political power to make these radical changes. It may well be argued that Ottomans’ 
down-to-earth assessment of their capabilities and efficient utilization of their 
economic, military and political power throughout the empire could be another 
reason (Pamuk, 2007, p.5).                   
When we consider today’s efforts of moving to single monetary unit in Europe, its 
slow pace and difficulties shows us that, Ottomans were being realistic by not 
forcing to establish a single monetary unit in the empire (Pamuk, 2007, p.12).              
Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire was not the only the basic key source of 
economic foundation but it was a dominant way of life, providing both livelihood and 
employment for the majority of Ottomans throughout the history. According to the 
calculations of the economist Vedat Elkem (1970), agriculture directly contributed 59 
percent of Anatolian GNP, while Anatolia provided 55 percent of all agricultural 
income and 48 percent of total GNP (p.302-303). Especially the fertile soil in 
northern Greece, where 88 percent of all cultivated land was set aside for wheat, 
barley and other cereals, accounted for 76 percent of the total value of agricultural 
production excluding animal products in 1907 (Pamuk, 1987, p.181).  
Although, there were many areas with high birth rate, especially in western and 
southern Anatolia, since the empire had to deal with many problems, the efficiency 
from agriculture couldn’t be provided or improved enough. One of the problems was 
the ayan class. Together with the weakening power of central government, ayan 
class became more powerful and dominant in Anatolia by the late eighteenth 
century, who was responsible as an intermediary between the government and the 
public in collecting taxes. They were collecting taxes in favor of large landowners, 
and burdening heavy taxes on small and medium peasant enterprises. It is argued 
that, although the empire or the ruler needed tax collectors (i.e., agents), in the 
 73 
Ottomans’ situation, this created a principle-agent problem. According to North 
(1981), the rents of the ruler will be diminished to some extent by his tax collectors, 
for example, the public bureaucracy.   
In the early 19th century, by signing Sened-i Ittifak agreement (1808) the balance of 
power between central government and ayan class changed. This agreement was a 
signal of the beginning of centralization in the empire.   
Second reason was scarcity in agrarian labor force compared to abundance of land. 
Between the 16th and 18th centuries, the population in Anatolia showed a net 
decline. Besides, wars, exploitation of peasants by ayans with heavy taxes, and 
economic and fiscal crisis, contributed to this outcome (Pamuk, 1987, p.183). The 
empire was aware that, the economic growth of the empire was dependent on the 
growth in agricultural production and inexpensive transportation of those products. 
Therefore, in the 19th century the population began to increase by immigration of 
Muslims from Caucasus and Crimean Khanate. The government settled those 
immigrants to places where there were labor shortage and railways. However, 
scarcity of labor continued to be an important feature of Ottoman agriculture until the 
WWI.       
Limited use of technology and inadequacy of transportation was another problem for 
Ottoman in agricultural production. After the Industrial Revolution, most of the 
European countries began to exploit the benefits of the new technology since 
technological progress is an essential factor explaining the long-term growth in 
Solow’s model. It explains how people today are more productive than they were a 
hundred years ago. Technological changes throughout the years make huge 
contribution to increasing productivity (Parkin, 2003, p.552). However, this 
technology came to the empire in the late 19th century. Large landowners in the 
western Anatolia began to employ laborsaving machinery since there was a labor 
shortage. In a normal economy, when there was an abundance of land but scarce 
labor, wages were expected to increase. However, in order not to lose their jobs, 
peasants accepted to work with great effort in consideration of lower wages. 
Although, this led small peasant enterprises to survive, it also prevented new 
technologies to be used in agriculture. Like agricultural production, the 
transportation of the products was also important for economic growth to be 
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achieved. After the establishment of railways, agricultural production increased by; 
first enabling immigrants to settle the areas where labor force was needed, then 
accessing to the cities where agricultural products demanded in large amounts.     
Todaro (1997) states that, “the core problems of widespread poverty, growing 
inequality, rapid population growth, and rising unemployment all find their origins in 
the stagnation and often retrogression of economic life in rural areas” and he 
continues “if development is to take place and become self-sustaining, it will, have 
to start in the rural areas in general and the agricultural sector in particular” (p.296). 
An economy like Ottomans’, which was mainly based on agriculture and labor force, 
should have followed technological improvements, necessary institutional reforms 
and price incentive changes, in order to try to rise domestic demand for agricultural 
output and diversify activities that supports farming community. By this way, the 
empire could have developed in agriculture and support sustainable economic 
growth. 
5.11 World War I 
5.11.1 The Economy in Pre-War Conditions 
Despite the growth in global economy in the 19th century especially after 1880, 
Ottoman still had agricultural economy before the WWI. Also national income per 
person was under Western and Eastern Europe’s averages (Pamuk, 2008, p.140). 
As it is mentioned earlier, the 19th century was a period that Ottoman Empire made 
many political, social and economical reforms to hold the empire together against 
inside and outside threats. Besides, during the 19th century Ottoman economy 
entered to the world economy. Empire’s foreign trade grew more than ten times 
between 1820 and 1914. 12 percent of the total productions were exporting, before 
the WWI. On the other hand, this rapid growth in foreign trade led the empire to 
import large amounts of finished goods. Due to the free trade agreement, domestic 
producers couldn’t be supported; the grain produced within hinterland couldn’t 
compete with imported grain. More than three fourth of Ottomans’ foreign trade was 
among European countries including Great Britain, Germany and France (ibid).  
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In rural areas, both small and large peasant enterprises had activities. The basic 
production unit was family enterprises who had two oxen and a land to cultivate. 
Coastal areas were cultivated intensively compared to hinterlands, which were 
scarce in terms of labor force and convenient land (ibid.).  
On the other hand, manufacturing activities were mostly relied on craft. Tanneries, 
cotton mills, flour mills, factories producing glass and brick, which were using new 
technology arose barely at the end of the 19th century. According to the industrial 
census in 1913, within the borders of today’s Turkey there were only 600 industrial 
enterprises, which employed ten or more labors. In these enterprises approximately 
35,000 people were employed and this number formed 0,2 percent of the total 
population. Most of these employments were intensively in textile, food processing, 
paper and printing and construction products (ibid).  
As it is mentioned before, in 1830s with many international agreements, Ottomans 
agreed to stabilize the customs duty around 5 percent at product’s value. These 
taxes were increased due to the opposition from guilds and manufacturers and it 
became over 15 percent before the WWI. Low customs duty made development of 
the domestic manufacturers difficult (ibid). 
Another important aspect of Ottoman economy opening into the world economy 
was, direct investments made by European capital. These investments became 75 
million pound sterling when it reached at its peak level. 60 percent of this amount 
was invested to railways especially in Anatolia and Syria. Railways helped Ottoman 
economy to integrate with the world economy by attaching productive agricultural 
areas to harbors. European capital made direct investments to infrastructure areas, 
public services, insurance and navigation, but investments to agriculture; mining and 
industrial areas were limited (ibid).  
Beginning from the Crimean war, Ottoman Empire tried to finance its budget deficit, 
which was mainly made up of military expenditures. In 1876, Ottoman announced 
that, the empire couldn’t continue to repay its debts. This is why Duyun-i Umumiye 
started to control most of the income sources. In 1914, the total amount of national 
debts was 140 million pound sterling. This amount was nearly 60 percent of the 
national income. More than half of the Ottoman Empire’s equity securities were 
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belonging to France, more than 20 percent was belonging to Germany and less than 
15 percent was belonging to Great Britain. Industry was poor and foreign debts were 
increasing gradually. Together with loss of lands in Balkans war, Ottomans’ 
population was increasing 1 percent per annum. Between 1880 and 1914, income 
per person was increasing a little less than 1 percent per annum (Pamuk, 2008, 
p.143).    
5.11.2 How Ready was Ottoman Empire for a Long Term War? 
Ottoman was less prepared for a long-term war than the other countries in terms of 
economic indicators. Ottoman Empire had over 12,000 km borders with 8,000 km 
shoreline and over 1,7 million km2 area excluding Arabian peninsula. Before the 
commencement of WWI, most of the trade was taking place via sea routes. After 
transportation by sea was stopped by allied powers, Ottoman could only use land 
route transportation for military activities. Years before the WWI, infrastructure 
programs of the empire had risen. Although, the government managed to maintain 
building railways, roads and telegraph lines, which first started under Abdulhamit II 
royalty, Ottomans’ transportation network was not enough to cover this wide 
geography (Pamuk, 2008, p.144). Eastern Anatolia, which had a significant place in 
the war, was lack of railways because Ottomans agreed on not to build any railways 
without Russia’s permission. In addition to that, when the war started, the railway 
connection between Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia was not built yet. Land routes 
were poor; pack animals were used in carrying. The empire was also lacking of 
modern communication tools, and communication network was limited (McCarty, 
2001, p.95-98 & Erickson, 2001, p.51-73).  
Ottoman Empire was not able to manufacture necessary war materials. Before the 
war, production of raw iron and steel was limited. Chemical production and refined 
petroleum production was also limited. There were only one gun foundry, one squib 
factory and one gunpowder factory. All of these factories were built outside Istanbul 
and they were not enough to meet internal demand. Another scarcity was energy. 
The empire was adequate for itself in terms of coal, but after bombing of coalmines 
in Black Sea region by Russia, Ottoman had to import coal from Germany. The 
production of coal was declined by 40 percent in 1916 and 75 percent in 1918. 
Another important point was the scarcity in skilled labor force. Since a lot of men 
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had gone to the war, the scarcity of labor force in industry sector was increased and 
this problem couldn’t be solved until the end of the war (Eldem, 1994, p.75-82). In 
addition to all these scarcities, Ottoman had to fight against British, French, Russian 
and Arabs in many fronts.        
Beginning from the end of 19th century, Ottoman was taking military consultancy 
support from Western European countries. Activities of German committee were 
started in 1880s during the royalty of Abdulhamit II. In the beginning of 20th century, 
Ottoman army was configured by taking German army as a model. However, in 
1912 and 1913 from Balkans alliance point of perspective, Ottoman suffered a 
defeat. Therefore, a radical change had happened; military budget was doubled and 
activities to form a modern army were started. Ottoman gave an order to British 
navy yard for new war ships and a new air force. Old army officers were retired to 
give their places to young better-educated officers (Pamuk, 2008, p.145).  
However, in 1914 the army was exhausted because of the Balkans War. In order to 
improve the army to the European standards, there was a limited time. Addition to 
that, there were some barriers to conscript men for the army too. 20 percent of the 
population was non-Muslim and they were paying taxes not to join the army. 
Besides, Ottoman had difficulties in keeping Muslims in the army. The total number 
of soldiers in the army was 800,000 during the war. This number was approximately 
less than 4 percent of the whole population and it was under the level of other 
countries’ average. Ottomans were dependent to import guns and military supplies 
until the end of the war. After the campaign of Serbia at the end of 1915, the empire 
faced with a scarcity of military supplies and raw materials until re-establishment of 
the railways between Western Europe. Despite these scarcities, while the other 
countries’ armies surrendered to the enemy, Ottoman army remained the last until 
October 1918 (Zurcher, 1996). During the war, support from German army was no 
more than giving consultancy. Both financial support and materials provided were 
poor. Right to the end of 1914, sources provided from Germany were increased. 
However, German military union in Ottoman army was still limited. (Pamuk, 2008, 
p.146-147). 
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5.11.3 The Ottoman Economy During WWI 
As it is mentioned before, Ottoman economy was dependent to import not only 
because of providing manufacturing and war supplies but also, in order to provide 
food requirements especially to the capital city. The first impact of the war was 
declining foreign trade. Therefore, Ottomans’ volume of foreign trade got smaller. In 
1916, Ottomans’ foreign trade volume decreased to one fifth of the level before the 
war and 90 percent of this volume was between Germany and Austria. In that case, 
scarcity especially in grain and sugar spread out rapidly. However, instead of 
implementing policies to support domestic production in order to meet the demand, 
the empire preferred to attach itself to the free trade agreements, and on going 
capitulation system, which allowed economical and legal concessions to foreign 
countries (Pamuk, 2008, p.148). 
After entering into the war, Ottoman government performed three important 
changes. First of all, they terminated the practice that allowed low customs duty on 
the value of the import products and started to apply higher customs duty on some 
of the specific import products to protect and support domestic industry. Secondly, 
Ottomans stopped repaying debts to France, Germany and Great Britain, 
suspended the activities of Duyun-i Umumiye. Lastly, capitulations were revoked 
(Pamuk, 2008, p.149-150). However, all of these efforts were so late to have 
enough corrective impacts on Ottoman economy.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that, during the war, Ottoman Empire 
experienced serious problems in agriculture sector. Due to the special requirements 
of the army, the production, which was lack of machinery, affected badly. Since 
most of the pack animals used in agriculture were confiscated by the army, both the 
number of farm animals and the production capacity declined (ibid).  
War period causes disequilibrium between the demand and the supply of food. But 
there is a difference between underdeveloped economies and developed 
economies in this respect. Agricultural structures in developed economies tried to 
maintain their production level as in the peace period. Since agricultural production 
of those developed economies was diversified, the sector did not affected seriously 
from stagnation. When there was a scarcity in labor force, this problem could be 
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replaced by machines or fertilizers for instance. Agricultural structures in 
underdeveloped economies were lack of this flexibility. Production structures of 
these countries were tougher and production techniques were basic, for instance, 
replacement of labor force and pack animals with machines wasn’t easy. In addition 
to that, underdeveloped economies were poor to provide a good transportation 
infrastructure between the regions. Overall, underdeveloped economies were less 
flexible and unprotected against the pressure of the war. Therefore, Ottomans’ 
imports and production declined rapidly (Pamuk, 2008, p.151-157).  
Beside the scarcity in the supply of food, inequality in distribution and consumption 
of food products caused damages in public spirit and motivation, thus affected the 
efforts shown in the war negatively. Therefore, controlling equal distribution of food 
supplies was Ottomans’ another problem experienced during the WWI (ibid).  
Briefly, during war period, Ottoman agriculture was less flexible and unprotected in 
compared to developed economies. War conditions caused serious problems 
especially in food supplies. While food production and imports were declining, 
supplies of the military and cities, and maintaining the stability of politics became 
vital problems for the empire (ibid). 
5.11.4 Financing War 
With the commencement of WWI, the military expenditures were increased rapidly. 
One way of financing war expenditures was to increase taxes. Before the war, total 
income coming from taxes was 12 percent of the empire’s national income (Eldem, 
1970, p.243-303). Two third of these taxes were collected from agricultural area. 
With the commencement of the war, all direct and indirect taxes were increased, but 
despite of all these efforts, income taxes didn’t increase. One of the reasons was, a 
serious decrease in agricultural and industrial production. The second, maybe the 
most important reason was, increased affinity to be reluctant to pay taxes in both 
cities and rural areas, and decrease in empire’s force to collect those taxes (Pamuk, 
2008, p.157-162). 
Rapid increase in war expenditures caused budget deficit to become huge. In order 
to control this deficit, the empire targeted salary payments, which was 40 percent of 
the empire’s total expenditures. Although, the number of civil servants increased by 
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20 percent during the war, the expenditures in terms of salaries decreased to the 
levels under 18 percent of the empire’s total expenditures (ibid).  
During the war, the empire indebted to foreign countries especially to the allied 
countries. 56 million pound sterling from Germany, 8,5 million pound sterling from 
Austria-Hungary was provided. The total value of all credits in terms of pre-war rate 
was 20 million pound sterling (ibid).  
Since the empire couldn’t achieve any results from all these methods, it introduced 
kaime (special sales notes) into the market. Therefore, printing banknotes became 
an important tool for Ottomans to finance its war expenditures. While the amount of 
money in circulation increased, its value against gold coins decreased as it is 
expected. Not only because of this monetary expansion but also along with 
encountering problems in food supply, caused prices to soar continuously. 
According to the data from Duyun-i Umumiye, prices were increased by over 20 
times from July 1914 to the end of 1918, and by over 18 times in the last quarter of 
1918. The inflation rate was 300 percent and this rate has never been experienced 
before in Ottoman history (ibid). 
5.11.5 Results of the War 
During the WWI, Ottoman Empire experienced an underdeveloped economy with 
limited managerial capacity. Neither the economy nor the empire could give enough 
response to the pressures generated by the war in the long run, and they remained 
under their performance during the peace period as well. Due to the pressures 
generated by the war, the production in both agriculture and industry decreased in 
large amounts. The empire was lack of ability to increase sources that could be 
directed to the war. Because of limited technology and production structure, results 
were hopeless. To sum up, it may well be argued that, Ottoman Empire with its 
fragile economy was not ready for a long-term war. (Pamuk, 2008, p.139-140). 
 81 
6. Limitations and Implications for Future 
Research 
The history of the Ottoman Empire is complicated. It doesn’t include only the 
Ottoman Empire but also the societies of different minorities, which ruled and/or 
lived under its rule such as Kurds, Arabs, Serbians, Greeks, Armenians, Hebrews, 
Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Albanians etc. Ottomans history is also a history of 
various religious groups like, Muslims, Jewish and Christians. Due to this 
diversification within the borders of the Ottomans, sources are diversified in terms of 
languages, alphabet and different names of places, which bring difficulties in 
translation.       
Although, the Ottoman history was frequently discussed in details, these 
discussions were written either from the European perspective or from Turkish. 
Therefore, most of the sources were written under the effects of European or 
Turkish prejudices. In the writing process of this paper, although the authors tried to 
reference both perspectives in order to provide a balance, there were still some 
limitations to keep this balance. 
Considering the reliability of the data used, there are some limitations in terms of its 
quality. It is important to note that comparisons are fraught with uncertainty, for 
instance as a result of differing consumption patterns in different locations and 
across time related to consumer price indices presented. There might be problems 
with comparisons across time and across regions, and, thus, that the data 
presented should be understood with a certain amount of caution.  
Besides, this paper looks events in an economic perspective and authors spent 
maximum effort in order not to include political and/or social perspectives. Thus, the 
probability of deviation in interpretation of the events shouldn’t be ignored.  
By referring to this study, comparisons with today’s modern Turkey in terms of 
economic aspects could be offered as an implication for further research. This kind 
of research may help to understand the reasons of some economic problems, which 
today’s Turkey is currently encountering. It may also lead to grasp if there are any 
overlapping economic situations with the Ottoman economic history.         
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7. Conclusions 
Throughout its history, Ottoman Empire put a significant effort to maintain its 
traditional order, however due to various reasons Ottomans could not stop 
loosening its power. Most of the problems faced were not only related with domestic 
reasons but also global for most of the time by their nature. Developments around 
the empire created a turbulent environment and Ottomans could not catch up with 
the new situation emerged. Considering all internal and external factors, it is 
observed that almost all of the conditions were met for an empire to decline. In order 
to understand these factors and their results for the empire, it is preferred to 
highlight them while mentioning their both positive and negative effects to the 
empire.  
To begin with, it is important to emphasize first, genuine Ottoman flexible, pragmatic 
and negotiating governing traditions. It is understood that the way Ottomans rule 
allowed them to restore order easily against any uprising. Being flexible instead of 
forcing strict rules gave Ottomans increased adaptability and enabled the empire to 
gather different talents from many different sources. However, on the other hand, 
the millet concept, which emanated from the same traditions, moved the minorities 
outside the framework of the Ottoman political system. The Ottoman millet system 
degraded with the continuous identification of the religious creed with ethnic 
nationality. Different millets in the Ottoman Empire became risk as non-loyal and 
non-patriotic social groups. Eventually being flexible instead of strict, allowing each 
millet to become increasingly independent inside the empire, prepared the ground 
for minorities to rise for their independence. Although the negative effect of 
nationalism movements after the French Revolution should not be denied, traditional 
way of governing of the Ottoman Empire caused more harm than its benefits. 
Extremely wide borders of the empire is another factor that should be analyzed. 
Standing at a crossroads of intercontinental trade allowed the empire to control most 
of the important trade routes and contributed to empire’s development. It is also a 
fact that the fertile lands of the empire especially in Anatolia contributed to empire’s 
agricultural development. However, while Ottomans were expanding their lands, the 
difficulties of controlling and governing distant provinces became a real challenge 
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for central bureaucracy. Increasing population and ethnic diversity along with 
expanding borders could be considered as another burden for the empire. 
Moreover, while the empire was getting wider, the demand for protecting these 
lands was increasing and maintaining order was getting difficult. Authors speculate 
that this situation might lead Ottomans to allocate most of its resources to national 
security instead of economic growth and, thus, contributed to economical decline. 
Around 1750, while most of the European countries were enjoying a long run 
economic growth during Industrial Revolution, Ottoman Empire were not fully aware 
of the fact that industrialization and international trade are the two most important 
engines for economic growth. Instead, Ottomans preferred to rely upon their 
traditional principles of governing and they stayed reluctant to transform these 
principles according to the new world. Although Ottomans’ institutions and their 
policies had an important role on its longevity, the same structure of government 
started to become a reason for their decline up to a certain point in history. The 
advantages of Ottomans, which gave them unique competitiveness in the past, 
started to become obsolete one by one as the time passes. Ottomans did not follow 
any mercantilist policies, which may assist the local merchants and industries to 
develop. The institutional frameworks were insufficient in order to give necessary 
incentives to entrepreneurs to create new technologies, establish new industries, 
manufacturing factories, mining sites etc. to catch up with rapid western industrial 
growth. Up until the year 1839, there were a limited effort to change and Ottomans 
were not only unable to forecast the future but also reluctant to take corrective 
measures. The latter efforts of reforms and corrective measures taken during WWI 
were simply late and Ottoman Empire became already vulnerable to exploitation of 
European capitalism. European countries demanded Ottomans to open into the 
foreign markets as much as possible in return of a reward for military, political and 
financial support. Therefore, reform activities followed with concessions in foreign 
trade and foreign capital without any protectionist policies. Thus, these policies 
caused local premature industries of the empire to extinct before they develop. All of 
these accepted agreements and compromises with Europe in an effort of survival 
caused only to expedite the pace of decline instead of saving the empire. Efforts of 
generating income of the empire were ineffective and caused the empire became 
more dependent to the developed economies. Shortsighted thoughts and policies to 
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finance increased budget deficits gave rise to increasing difficulties to maintain price 
stability of the empire. This situation led lower saving rates and lower investments 
within the empire, which was burdening any possible economic improvement.    
The importance of internal factors behind decline such as Ottoman policies, 
structure of its economical institutions etc. should not be underestimated as well. 
Traditional economic principles of the empire such as provisionism, traditionalism 
and fiscalism barred the process of economic growth and hindered the introduction 
of any new technology.    
Under all these circumstances it is not a surprising fact that Ottoman Empire was 
defeated in WWI, and collapsed in the aftermath of the war. Authors concluded that 
beside all of the factors mentioned, the true reason behind the decline and collapse 
was the inability of the empire to adapt itself to the both internal and external 
changes and not being resilient to foreign threats, which resulted in significant 
economical trauma. 
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Data Appendix 
Figure 2, Figure 8:  
 
 
 
Years 
CPI in 
terms of 
Coins 
1469=1,0 
Quantity 
of gram 
silver in 
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1469=1,0 
 
 
 
Years 
CPI in 
terms of 
Coins 
1469=1,0 
Quantity 
of gram 
silver in 
Coins 
CPI 
(grams 
silver) 
1469=1,0 
1469-
79 
1,20 0,85 1,17 1720-
29 
6,98 0,13 1,06 
1480-
89 
1,30 0,68 1,02 1730-
39 
7,62 0,12 1,10 
1490-
99 
1,09 0,68 0,85 1740-
49 
9,93 0,12 1,39 
1520-
29 
1,87 0,66 1,42 1750-
59 
10,1 0,11 1,30 
1550-
59 
1,64 0,66 1,25 1760-
69 
11,1 0,10 1,23 
1560-
69 
1,86 0,61 1,32 1770-
79 
17,8 0,093 1,93 
1570-
79 
1,99 0,61 1,41 1780-
89 
17,2 0,080 1,58 
1580-
89 
3,35 0,39 1,47 1790-
99 
24,5 0,053 1,50 
1590-
99 
4,45 0,30 1,46 1800-
09 
34,7 0,048 1,91 
1600-
09 
5,43 0,29 1,81 1810-
19 
49,5 0,032 1,86 
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1610-
19 
4,44 0,29 1,47 1820-
29 
62,8 0,018 1,26 
1620-
29 
5,56 0,25 1,54 1830-
39 
130,1 0,0073 1,12 
1630-
39 
5,49 0,20 1,24 1840-
49 
181,0 0,0081 1,70 
1640-
49 
4,37 0,27 1,34 1850-
59 
240,5 0,0083 2,32 
1650-
59 
4,92 0,27 1,56 1860-
69 
285,7 0,0083 2,76 
1660-
69 
5,82 0,23 1,56 1870-
79 
265,6 0,0083 2,56 
1670-
79 
7,06 0,21 1,69 1880-
89 
238,1 0,0083 2,30 
1680-
89 
7,46 0,21 1,79 1890-
99 
235,6 0,0083 2,27 
1690-
99 
7,96 0,13 1,21 1900-
09 
220,9 0,0083 2,13 
1700-
09 
6,05 0,13 0,92 1910-
14 
294,2 0,0083 2,84 
1710-
19 
6,87 0,13 1,03     
Figure 2: Summary of Price Index (ten years average) TFE: Consumer Price Index 
Source: Pamuk, 2007, p.110 
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Nominal Daily Prices Consumer Price 
Index (1469 = 1,0) 
Regular Worker Skilled Worker 
Real Daily Prices 
(1489/1490 = 1,0) 
 
 
 
 
Years 
Coin Silver Coin Silver Coin Silver Regular Skilled 
1469-
1479 
1,20 1,17       
1480-
1489 
1,30 1,02 4,9 3,3 9,8 6,6 0,93 1,04 
1490-
1499 
1,09 0,85 4,7 3,1 7,7 5,2 1,06 0,96 
1540-
1549 
1,60 1,00 5,3 3,5 9,6 6,3 0,86 0,92 
1550-
1559 
1,64 1,25 5,0 3,3 9,7 6,4 0,78 0,86 
1560-
1569 
1,86 1,32 5,9 3,8 9,3 6,0 0,83 0,73 
1570-
1579 
1,99 1,41 5,6 3,4 9,9 6,0 0,68 0,66 
1580-
1589 
3,35 1,47 8,1 3,5 12,4 5,4 0,65 0,53 
1590-
1599 
4,45 1,46 11,7 2,6 20,7 4,6 0,51 0,50 
1600-
1609 
5,43 1,81 13,9 4,0 22,5 6,5 0,62 0,56 
1610-
1619 
4,44 1,47 14,2 4,1 22,8 6,6 0,76 0,67 
1620-
1629 
5,56 1,54 15,0 3,4 18,3 4,1 0,84 0,57 
1640-
1649 
4,37 1,34 15,2 4,2 29,5 8,2 0,79 0,84 
1660-
1669 
5,82 1,56 19,5 4,4 29,9 6,8 0,81 0,69 
1670-
1679 
7,06 1,69 18,0 3,7 23,0 4,8 0,71 0,50 
1680-
1689 
7,46 1,79 21,8 4,5 33,4 6,9 0,73 0,62 
1690-
1699 
7,96 1,21 26,2 3,4 36,9 4,8 0,78 0,61 
1700-
1709 
6,05 0,92 23,8 3,1 38,0 5,0 1,02 0,90 
1710-
1719 
6,87 1,03 25,2 3,3 38,2 5,0 0,92 0,77 
1720-
1729 
6,98 1,06 26,4 3,5 42,3 5,6 0,97 0,85 
1730-
1739 
7,62 1,10 30,6 3,8 44,8 5,6 0,94 0,76 
1740-
1749 
9.93 1,39 32,5 3,9 51,1 6,2 0,91 0,79 
1750-
1759 
10,1 1,30 32,4 3,6 58,6 6,6 0,76 0,75 
1760-
1769 
11.1 1,23 30,3 2,9 50,8 4,8 0,70 0,64 
1770-
1779 
17,8 1,93 38,7 3,6 71,2 6,7 0,52 0,51 
1780-
1789 
17,2 1,58 56,9 4,7 113,4 9,4 0,86 0,94 
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1790-
1799 
24,5 1,50 80,2 4,1 148,4 7,7 0,84 0,84 
1800-
1809 
34,7 1,91 114,4 5,3 217,7 10,0 0,84 0,88 
1810-
1819 
49,5 1,86 202,6 6,9 401,2 13,7 0,95 1,04 
1820-
1829 
62,8 1,26 275,9 5,0 475,4 8,9 1,13 1,10 
1830-
1839 
130,1 1,12 608,8 4,5 1.054 7,8 1,11 1,05 
1840-
1849 
181,0 1,70 717,2 5,9 1.238 10,1 0,99 0,95 
1850-
1859 
240,5 2,32 935,3 7,8 1.599 13,3 1,38 1,30 
1860-
1869 
285,7 2,76 964,7 8,0 1.716 14,3 0,81 0,80 
1870-
1879 
265,6 2,56 941,4 7,8 1.989 16,6 0,86 0,89 
1880-
1889 
238,1 2,30 944,0 7,9 2.061 17,2 0,91 1,04 
1890-
1899 
235,6 2,27 1.063 8,9 2.308 19,2 1,12 1,35 
1900-
1909 
220,9 2,13 993,5 8,3 2.150 17,9 1,10 1,31 
1910-
1914 
294,2 2,84 1.861 12,6 3.450 26,6 1,30 1,51 
Figure 8: Wages and Prices in Istanbul, 1469-1911 (ten years average) 
Source: Pamuk, 2007, p.166 
 
 
 
 
 
